Alas, the first link seems almost too silly to bother with to me, but briefly:
Unobjectionable—to whom? An agent objecting to another agent’s values is a simple and trivial occurrence. All an agent has to do is to state that—according to its values—it wants to use the atoms of the agent with the supposedly unobjectionable utility function for something else.
“Ensure continued co-existence” is vague and wishy-washy. Perhaps publicly work through some “trolley problems” using it—so people have some idea of what you think it means.
You claim there can be no rational objection to your preferred utility function.
In fact, an agent with a different utility function can (obviously) object to its existence—on grounds of instrumental rationality. I am not clear on why you don’t seem to recognise this.
Alas, the first link seems almost too silly to bother with to me, but briefly:
Unobjectionable—to whom? An agent objecting to another agent’s values is a simple and trivial occurrence. All an agent has to do is to state that—according to its values—it wants to use the atoms of the agent with the supposedly unobjectionable utility function for something else.
“Ensure continued co-existence” is vague and wishy-washy. Perhaps publicly work through some “trolley problems” using it—so people have some idea of what you think it means.
You claim there can be no rational objection to your preferred utility function.
In fact, an agent with a different utility function can (obviously) object to its existence—on grounds of instrumental rationality. I am not clear on why you don’t seem to recognise this.