This seems to me to be an ad populum fallacy. Just because everyone acts as if there is one, true morality doesn’t make it so. Or am I missing something?
The great commonalities between humans might make many of our moralities very similar, but I think there are some differences. For one example, I think eating (factory farmed) meat is a great moral wrong, but I don’t think there’s anything, even in principle, I could say to convince some other people to share my view.
There are two steps to my reasoning. First, if everyone acts as if agreement is possible, that tends to make it much more likely that agreement is, in fact, possible. The second step is a meta-ethical analysis which says that, if everyone freely and rationally agrees on a set of norms, virtues, etc., that is morality. (Or at least, an important part of it.) Of course, the second step is open to debate too, and popular opinion is irrelevant there. But a near-universal and deeply ingrained drive to reason-together-what-to-do is relevant to the first step.
If there are behavior codes you live by but you don’t think you could convince others to live by, you could call that “morality” if you insist. In that case, the rules that we all can rationally agree to cooperate under aren’t all of morality, but just a part of it—“justice”, maybe.
First, if everyone acts as if agreement is possible, that tends to make it much more likely that agreement is, in fact, possible. The second step is a meta-ethical analysis which says that, if everyone freely and rationally agrees on a set of norms, virtues, etc., that is morality.
I agree. But I think that people act as if agreement is possible not because they are thinking of morality in the consensus sense but rather that they are thinking of morality as an actual law external to people. For many of them, perhaps, even the law of God.
I wonder if there’s any experimental philosophy on lay people’s thoughts on meta-ethics. It would be interesting to see, for sure.
If there are behavior codes you live by but you don’t think you could convince others to live by, you could call that “morality” if you insist. In that case, the rules that we all can rationally agree to cooperate under aren’t all of morality, but just a part of it—“justice”, maybe.
You’re right that perhaps we’re debating definitions and not substance. But I think you’d be hardpressed to come up with what behaviors are actually in the “consensus morality”. And it’s going to end up a lot like cultural relativism.
What I’d advocate is more of an ends relativism—actually making things clearer by specifically stating which normative/moral ends we’re dealing with. For example, we could contrast the claim “One ought to be a vegetarian (relative to the end of utilitarianism)” versus the claim “One is ethically permitted to eat meat (relative to the common moral beliefs of our culture)”.
I doubt that much hangs what people’s meta-ethical intuitions are. Compare, for example, the issue of what people’s theory of the nature of “gold” is. If people generally think that gold is what it is because the gods have mixed their aura into it, still, what gold actually is depends only on what explains the features whereby we recognize it. That explanans still comes down to its having atomic number 79 - gods be damned. And, to boot, the religious theorists of Aurum might claim to high heaven that without its divine connection, gold would be worthless. But I doubt you’d find much jewelry in the trash can after they switch theories. Similarly, I don’t think a switch from divine-command to rational-agreement metaethics will result in trashing morality.
This seems to me to be an ad populum fallacy. Just because everyone acts as if there is one, true morality doesn’t make it so. Or am I missing something?
The great commonalities between humans might make many of our moralities very similar, but I think there are some differences. For one example, I think eating (factory farmed) meat is a great moral wrong, but I don’t think there’s anything, even in principle, I could say to convince some other people to share my view.
Good points to raise, thanks.
There are two steps to my reasoning. First, if everyone acts as if agreement is possible, that tends to make it much more likely that agreement is, in fact, possible. The second step is a meta-ethical analysis which says that, if everyone freely and rationally agrees on a set of norms, virtues, etc., that is morality. (Or at least, an important part of it.) Of course, the second step is open to debate too, and popular opinion is irrelevant there. But a near-universal and deeply ingrained drive to reason-together-what-to-do is relevant to the first step.
If there are behavior codes you live by but you don’t think you could convince others to live by, you could call that “morality” if you insist. In that case, the rules that we all can rationally agree to cooperate under aren’t all of morality, but just a part of it—“justice”, maybe.
I agree. But I think that people act as if agreement is possible not because they are thinking of morality in the consensus sense but rather that they are thinking of morality as an actual law external to people. For many of them, perhaps, even the law of God.
I wonder if there’s any experimental philosophy on lay people’s thoughts on meta-ethics. It would be interesting to see, for sure.
You’re right that perhaps we’re debating definitions and not substance. But I think you’d be hardpressed to come up with what behaviors are actually in the “consensus morality”. And it’s going to end up a lot like cultural relativism.
What I’d advocate is more of an ends relativism—actually making things clearer by specifically stating which normative/moral ends we’re dealing with. For example, we could contrast the claim “One ought to be a vegetarian (relative to the end of utilitarianism)” versus the claim “One is ethically permitted to eat meat (relative to the common moral beliefs of our culture)”.
I doubt that much hangs what people’s meta-ethical intuitions are. Compare, for example, the issue of what people’s theory of the nature of “gold” is. If people generally think that gold is what it is because the gods have mixed their aura into it, still, what gold actually is depends only on what explains the features whereby we recognize it. That explanans still comes down to its having atomic number 79 - gods be damned. And, to boot, the religious theorists of Aurum might claim to high heaven that without its divine connection, gold would be worthless. But I doubt you’d find much jewelry in the trash can after they switch theories. Similarly, I don’t think a switch from divine-command to rational-agreement metaethics will result in trashing morality.