the region they occupy is quite small for good reasons.
The region is exactly as large as it is. The fact that is has size, and is not a single point, tells you that our moralities are different. In some things, the difference will not matter, and in some it will. It seems we don’t have any problem finding things to fight over. However small you want to say that the differences are, there’s a lot of conflict over them.
The more I look around, the more I see people with fundamentally different ways of thinking and valuing. Now I suppose they have more commonality between them and banana slugs, and likely they would band together should the banana slugs rise up and launch a sneak attack. But these different kinds of people with different values often don’t seem to want to live in the same world.
Hitchens writes in Newsweek magazine: “Winston Churchill … found it intolerable even to breathe the same air, or share the same continent or planet, as the Nazis.”
(By the way, if anyone can find the original source from Churchill, I’d appreciate it.)
I’d also note that even having contextually identical moralities doesn’t imply a lack of conflict. We could all be psychopaths. Some percentage of us are already there.
Viewed against the entirety of mindspace we are practically identical, and we have minds that care about that.
Seems like our minds care quite a lot about the differences, however small you think they are. The differences aren’t small, by the measure of how much we care about them.
No amount of reality need have the slightest impact on moral realists.
Is there any experiment that could be run that would refute moral realism?
Maybe Clippy is right, we should all be clippists, and we’re just all “wrong” to think otherwise. Clippism—the true objective morality. Clippy seems to think so. I don’t, and I don’t care what Clippy thinks in this regard.
It also doesn’t equate to non-empiricism. Eg “Fish do not feel pain, so angling is not cruel”>
3.If you are like a clippy—an entity that only uses rationality to fulfil arbitrary aims—you won’t be convinced/.Guess what? That has no impact on realism whatsoever. A compelling argument is an argument capable of compelling an agent capable of understanding it, and with a commitment to rationality as an end.
You asked two questions. My reply was meant to indicate that arbitrariness depends on coherence and extrapolation (revision, reflection), both of which Clippy has rather less of whichthan I do.
The region is exactly as large as it is. The fact that is has size, and is not a single point, tells you that our moralities are different. In some things, the difference will not matter, and in some it will. It seems we don’t have any problem finding things to fight over. However small you want to say that the differences are, there’s a lot of conflict over them.
The more I look around, the more I see people with fundamentally different ways of thinking and valuing. Now I suppose they have more commonality between them and banana slugs, and likely they would band together should the banana slugs rise up and launch a sneak attack. But these different kinds of people with different values often don’t seem to want to live in the same world.
Hitchens writes in Newsweek magazine: “Winston Churchill … found it intolerable even to breathe the same air, or share the same continent or planet, as the Nazis.”
(By the way, if anyone can find the original source from Churchill, I’d appreciate it.)
I’d also note that even having contextually identical moralities doesn’t imply a lack of conflict. We could all be psychopaths. Some percentage of us are already there.
Seems like our minds care quite a lot about the differences, however small you think they are. The differences aren’t small, by the measure of how much we care about them.
No amount of difference or disagreement makes the slightest impact on realism. Realists accept that some many or all people are wrong.
Of course.
No amount of reality need have the slightest impact on moral realists.
Is there any experiment that could be run that would refute moral realism?
Maybe Clippy is right, we should all be clippists, and we’re just all “wrong” to think otherwise. Clippism—the true objective morality. Clippy seems to think so. I don’t, and I don’t care what Clippy thinks in this regard.
Realism does not equate to empiricism
It also doesn’t equate to non-empiricism. Eg “Fish do not feel pain, so angling is not cruel”>
3.If you are like a clippy—an entity that only uses rationality to fulfil arbitrary aims—you won’t be convinced/.Guess what? That has no impact on realism whatsoever. A compelling argument is an argument capable of compelling an agent capable of understanding it, and with a commitment to rationality as an end.
Are your aims arbitrary? If not, why are Clippy’s aims arbitrary, and your’s not arbitrary?
Clippy doesn’t care aboiut having a coherent set of aims, or about revising and improving its aims.
That doesn’t answer my question.
You asked two questions. My reply was meant to indicate that arbitrariness depends on coherence and extrapolation (revision, reflection), both of which Clippy has rather less of whichthan I do.