I’m dumbfounded at how any one particular theory of morality could be “the one true one”, except in so far as someone personally chooses that theory over others based on preferences and desires.
Great, we agree, let’s choose based on preferences and desires :P
Are moral facts contingent; could morality have been different?
What people say and do could have been different, so when using “morality” descriptively, like “people could have different moralities,” then sure. But “morality the referent,” the algorithm that takes in a situation like “punching puppies” and returns “punching puppies is right” or “punching puppies is wrong,” wouldn’t change—people can refer to a different algorithm when they said “morality,” but they can’t change the thing I refer to. Articulated in this post.
How does morality get it’s ability to be rationally binding?
Because humans have some abstract things that influence our actions, and morality, as written about by humans, is used to describe human actions. I’m reminded of Douglas Adams’ puddle: “Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, ‘This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn’t it?’”
But “morality the referent,” the algorithm that takes in a situation like “punching puppies” and returns “punching puppies is right” or “punching puppies is wrong,” wouldn’t change—people can refer to a different algorithm when they said “morality,” but they can’t change the thing I refer to. Articulated in this post.
I don’t disagree with that. But I think it’s a mistake for someone to leap from talking about “my morality” to “morality (in general)”. Perhaps this is what projectivists get at?
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Because humans have some abstract things that influence our actions, and morality, as written about by humans, is used to describe human actions. I’m reminded of Douglas Adams’ puddle: “Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, ‘This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn’t it?’”
I think it’s a mistake for someone to leap from talking about “my morality” to “morality (in general)”. Perhaps this is what projectivists get at?
I have no clue if it’s what projectivists get at, so you may want to elaborate :P
Because humans have some abstract things that influence our actions, and morality, as written about by humans, is used to describe human actions. I’m reminded of Douglas Adams’ puddle: “Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, ‘This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn’t it?’”
I don’t quite understand your use of the analogy.
I’m implying that people first noticed what influenced them, and then decided to call parts of it “morality.” Thus making it no great mystery that morality influences people. The puddle was shaped to fit the hole, so it has no right to be surprised when it finds itself in a hole that fits it.
I have no clue if it’s what projectivists get at, so you may want to elaborate :P
Projectivism is, I suppose, a part psychological and part meta-ethical theory that suggests people talk about their own desires about how the world should be as if they are objective, mind-independent moral truths. Hence “my morality” → “morality”.
I’m implying that people first noticed what influenced them, and then decided to call parts of it “morality.” Thus making it no great mystery that morality influences people. The puddle was shaped to fit the hole, so it has no right to be surprised when it finds itself in a hole that fits it.
That makes sense. But that implies a desires-based theory of moral motivation, which isn’t usually considered moral realism.
Great, we agree, let’s choose based on preferences and desires :P
What people say and do could have been different, so when using “morality” descriptively, like “people could have different moralities,” then sure. But “morality the referent,” the algorithm that takes in a situation like “punching puppies” and returns “punching puppies is right” or “punching puppies is wrong,” wouldn’t change—people can refer to a different algorithm when they said “morality,” but they can’t change the thing I refer to. Articulated in this post.
Because humans have some abstract things that influence our actions, and morality, as written about by humans, is used to describe human actions. I’m reminded of Douglas Adams’ puddle: “Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, ‘This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn’t it?’”
I don’t disagree with that. But I think it’s a mistake for someone to leap from talking about “my morality” to “morality (in general)”. Perhaps this is what projectivists get at?
~
I don’t quite understand your use of the analogy.
I have no clue if it’s what projectivists get at, so you may want to elaborate :P
I’m implying that people first noticed what influenced them, and then decided to call parts of it “morality.” Thus making it no great mystery that morality influences people. The puddle was shaped to fit the hole, so it has no right to be surprised when it finds itself in a hole that fits it.
Projectivism is, I suppose, a part psychological and part meta-ethical theory that suggests people talk about their own desires about how the world should be as if they are objective, mind-independent moral truths. Hence “my morality” → “morality”.
That makes sense. But that implies a desires-based theory of moral motivation, which isn’t usually considered moral realism.
Yeah, agreed—it’s only moral realism in the sense that “I’m right, you’re wrong” can be a true thing to say.
I call that “success theory” and I agree with it.