In the case of Many-Worlds interpretations or parallel universes, the correct response is to be like Alice, and admit that multiple perspectives are equally admissible. (This is assuming that they truly are empirically indistinguishable.
This is no worse than accepting that there might be multiple mathematical proofs of the Pythagorean theorem, some algebraic and some geometric, or than accepting that angles can be expressed in degrees or in radians. All are equally valid ways to think about the same problem, so use whatever you like.
This seems not quite right to me, in that I doubt we can draw this equivalence. In the case of mathematical proofs and the units with which to measure angles, we can be indifferent between the choices in the case that our purpose (what we care about; our telos) is proving a statement true or having a measure of an angle, respectively, but if we care about length of proof or proof assumptions (maybe we want a proof of a theorem that doesn’t rely on the axiom of choice) or angle units supported by a calculator or elegance of working with particular units then there is a difference between these that matters.
So it is with explanations. If our purpose is to make predictions about quantum effects, then a theory about how quantum mechanics works isn’t important, only that the mathematical model predicts reality, and metaphysical questions are moot. But if our purpose is to understand what’s going on beyond what can be predicted using quantum mechanics, then we care a lot about which interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct because it does make predictions about the thing we care about.
This kind of not-caring-because-it-works is only practical so long as it is pragmatic to a particular purpose. Perhaps many people should be more pragmatic, but that seems a separate issue, and there are many reasons why what is pragmatic for one purpose may not be for another, so I think your view is true but insufficient.
You say, ”...we care a lot about which interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct because it does make predictions about the thing we care about.” I agree that if different interpretations make different predictions about things we care about (or any things), then we should care a lot about the interpretation.
However, I am writing explicitly about cases where different interpretations strictly do not make different predictions. In the section you quote, I say, “This is assuming that they [the different perspectives] truly are empirically indistinguishable.”
A reasonable objection might be that different theories can never truly be empirically indistinguishable. If so, then my arguments would apply only to cases where theories seem indistinguishable for the moment.
You also say that our purpose may be “to understand what’s going on beyond what can be predicted”; the issue is that observations are the only tool we have to understand what is going on. If two theories both fit all available and predict the same potential observations, those theories seem to be perfectly equal.
This seems not quite right to me, in that I doubt we can draw this equivalence. In the case of mathematical proofs and the units with which to measure angles, we can be indifferent between the choices in the case that our purpose (what we care about; our telos) is proving a statement true or having a measure of an angle, respectively, but if we care about length of proof or proof assumptions (maybe we want a proof of a theorem that doesn’t rely on the axiom of choice) or angle units supported by a calculator or elegance of working with particular units then there is a difference between these that matters.
So it is with explanations. If our purpose is to make predictions about quantum effects, then a theory about how quantum mechanics works isn’t important, only that the mathematical model predicts reality, and metaphysical questions are moot. But if our purpose is to understand what’s going on beyond what can be predicted using quantum mechanics, then we care a lot about which interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct because it does make predictions about the thing we care about.
This kind of not-caring-because-it-works is only practical so long as it is pragmatic to a particular purpose. Perhaps many people should be more pragmatic, but that seems a separate issue, and there are many reasons why what is pragmatic for one purpose may not be for another, so I think your view is true but insufficient.
You say, ”...we care a lot about which interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct because it does make predictions about the thing we care about.” I agree that if different interpretations make different predictions about things we care about (or any things), then we should care a lot about the interpretation.
However, I am writing explicitly about cases where different interpretations strictly do not make different predictions. In the section you quote, I say, “This is assuming that they [the different perspectives] truly are empirically indistinguishable.”
A reasonable objection might be that different theories can never truly be empirically indistinguishable. If so, then my arguments would apply only to cases where theories seem indistinguishable for the moment.
You also say that our purpose may be “to understand what’s going on beyond what can be predicted”; the issue is that observations are the only tool we have to understand what is going on. If two theories both fit all available and predict the same potential observations, those theories seem to be perfectly equal.
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/f4txACqDWithRi7hs/occam-s-razor
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/3XMwPNMSbaPm2suGz/belief-in-the-implied-invisible
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Atu4teGvob5vKvEAF/decoherence-is-simple