A more interesting (to me) definition of sacred cow is: a belief that causes you to not notice mistakes you make. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch rationalists and non-rationalists doing it.
Basically this:
“The conventional definition of [thing widely agreed-upon to be bad] is ‘[normal definition]’. But a more interesting definition is ‘[completely different definition, of which it’s not at all clear that it’s bad]’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
Examples:
“The conventional definition of ‘stealing’ is ‘taking something, without permission, which doesn’t belong to you’. But a more interesting definition is ‘owning something which is unethical to own’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
“The conventional definition of ‘fraud’ is ‘knowingly deceiving people, for profit’. But a more interesting definition is ‘making money by doing something which runs counter to people’s expectations’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
“The conventional definition of ‘adultery’ is ‘having sexual relations with a person other than the one with whom you have a monogamous marriage’. But a more interesting definition is ‘doing something which causes your spouse to experience jealousy’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
Yeah, no kidding it’s easier to catch people doing it—because it’s a completely different thing! Why would you call it by the same term (“sacred cow”, “theft”, “fraud”, “adultery”)—unless you wanted to sneak in negative affect, without first doing the work of demonstrating (or, indeed, even explicitly claiming) that the thing described by your new definition is, in fact, bad?
First: Yes I agree that my thing is a different thing, different enough to warrant a new name. And I am sneaking in negative affect.
Yeah, no kidding it’s easier to catch people doing it—because it’s a completely different thing!
Indeed, I am implicitly arguing that we should be focused on faults-we-actually-have[0], not faults-it’s-easy-to-see-we-don’t. My example of this is the above-linked podcast, where the hosts hem and haw and, after thinking about it, decide they have no sacred cows, and declare that Good (full disclosure: I like the podcast).
“Sacred-cow” as “well-formed proposition about the world you’d choose to be ignorant of” is clearly bad to LWers, so much so that it’s non-tribal.
[0] And especially, faults-we-have-in-common-with-non-rationalists! I said, “The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch rationalists and non-rationalists doing it.” Said Achmiz gave examples using the word “people,” but I intended to group rationalists with non-rationalists.
Basically this:
“The conventional definition of [thing widely agreed-upon to be bad] is ‘[normal definition]’. But a more interesting definition is ‘[completely different definition, of which it’s not at all clear that it’s bad]’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
Examples:
“The conventional definition of ‘stealing’ is ‘taking something, without permission, which doesn’t belong to you’. But a more interesting definition is ‘owning something which is unethical to own’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
“The conventional definition of ‘fraud’ is ‘knowingly deceiving people, for profit’. But a more interesting definition is ‘making money by doing something which runs counter to people’s expectations’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
“The conventional definition of ‘adultery’ is ‘having sexual relations with a person other than the one with whom you have a monogamous marriage’. But a more interesting definition is ‘doing something which causes your spouse to experience jealousy’. The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch people doing it.”
Yeah, no kidding it’s easier to catch people doing it—because it’s a completely different thing! Why would you call it by the same term (“sacred cow”, “theft”, “fraud”, “adultery”)—unless you wanted to sneak in negative affect, without first doing the work of demonstrating (or, indeed, even explicitly claiming) that the thing described by your new definition is, in fact, bad?
To be honest, I like all of your new definitions better that conventional ones.
Why?
They are more alligned with the actual wrongness of an act.
I confess to some perplexity, as I specifically constructed them to be less aligned with the actual wrongness of an act!
First: Yes I agree that my thing is a different thing, different enough to warrant a new name. And I am sneaking in negative affect.
Indeed, I am implicitly arguing that we should be focused on faults-we-actually-have[0], not faults-it’s-easy-to-see-we-don’t. My example of this is the above-linked podcast, where the hosts hem and haw and, after thinking about it, decide they have no sacred cows, and declare that Good (full disclosure: I like the podcast).
“Sacred-cow” as “well-formed proposition about the world you’d choose to be ignorant of” is clearly bad to LWers, so much so that it’s non-tribal.
[0] And especially, faults-we-have-in-common-with-non-rationalists! I said, “The advantage of this definition is that it’s easier to catch rationalists and non-rationalists doing it.” Said Achmiz gave examples using the word “people,” but I intended to group rationalists with non-rationalists.