I think all this amounts to is: there can be situations in which there is no optimal action, and therefore if we insist on defining “rational” to mean “always taking the optimal action” then no agent can be perfectly “rational” in that sense. But I don’t know of any reason to adopt that definition. We can still say, e.g., that one course of action is more rational than another, even in situations where no course of action is most rational.
“We can still say, e.g., that one course of action is more rational than another, even in situations where no course of action is most rational.”—True.
“But I don’t know of any reason to adopt that definition”—perfect rationality means to me more rational than any other agent. I think that is a reasonable definition.
Very closely related: Stuart Armstrong’s Naturalism versus unbounded (or unmaximisable) utility options from about three years ago.
I think all this amounts to is: there can be situations in which there is no optimal action, and therefore if we insist on defining “rational” to mean “always taking the optimal action” then no agent can be perfectly “rational” in that sense. But I don’t know of any reason to adopt that definition. We can still say, e.g., that one course of action is more rational than another, even in situations where no course of action is most rational.
“We can still say, e.g., that one course of action is more rational than another, even in situations where no course of action is most rational.”—True.
“But I don’t know of any reason to adopt that definition”—perfect rationality means to me more rational than any other agent. I think that is a reasonable definition.
Seeing as this is an entire article about nitpicking and mathematical constructs...
Surely that should be “at least as rational as any other agent”?
Thanks for this comment. I agree, but can’t be bothered editing.