Sorry, I’m not seeing it. Could you spell out how?
I agree that allowing simulation arguments changes the ball game. For instance, sim args favor universes with lots of simulated copies of you. This requires that at least one alien civilization develops AI within a given local region of the universe, which in turn requires that the filters can’t be too strong. But this is different from Katja’s argument.
To simplify things imagine that before you think about the Fermi paradox you calculate that we are in one of four types of universes:
In (A) civilizations frequently reach our level of development and then survive for a long time. In (B) civilizations frequently reach our level of development but then quickly get destroyed. In (C) civilizations rarely reach our level of development but if they do they survive for a long time. In (D) civilizations rarely reach our level of development but get quickly destroyed if they do. You assign some probability to our universe being in (B) or (D) (i.e. we are doomed).
Then you think about the Fermi paradox and realize that it drastically reduces the odds we are in (A), and this causes you to update thinking it more likely that we are in (B) or (D). Then you realize that since more brains like yours exist in (B) then (C), we are in big trouble.
Thanks! I think this is basically a restatement of Katja’s argument. The problem seems to be that comparing number of brains like ours isn’t the right question. The question is how many minds are exactly ours, and this number has to be the same (ignoring simulations) between (B) and (C): namely, there is one civilization exactly like ours in either case.
So if eternal inflation were correct and there were a vast number of universes, many corresponding to (A), (B), (C), and (D) with many minds exactly like yours in each then you would accept Katja’s argument?
Not sure of the relevance of eternal inflation. However, I think I’ve realized where my argument went astray and have updated the post accordingly. Let me know if we still disagree.
Sorry, I’m not seeing it. Could you spell out how?
I agree that allowing simulation arguments changes the ball game. For instance, sim args favor universes with lots of simulated copies of you. This requires that at least one alien civilization develops AI within a given local region of the universe, which in turn requires that the filters can’t be too strong. But this is different from Katja’s argument.
To simplify things imagine that before you think about the Fermi paradox you calculate that we are in one of four types of universes:
In (A) civilizations frequently reach our level of development and then survive for a long time. In (B) civilizations frequently reach our level of development but then quickly get destroyed. In (C) civilizations rarely reach our level of development but if they do they survive for a long time. In (D) civilizations rarely reach our level of development but get quickly destroyed if they do. You assign some probability to our universe being in (B) or (D) (i.e. we are doomed).
Then you think about the Fermi paradox and realize that it drastically reduces the odds we are in (A), and this causes you to update thinking it more likely that we are in (B) or (D). Then you realize that since more brains like yours exist in (B) then (C), we are in big trouble.
Thanks! I think this is basically a restatement of Katja’s argument. The problem seems to be that comparing number of brains like ours isn’t the right question. The question is how many minds are exactly ours, and this number has to be the same (ignoring simulations) between (B) and (C): namely, there is one civilization exactly like ours in either case.
So if eternal inflation were correct and there were a vast number of universes, many corresponding to (A), (B), (C), and (D) with many minds exactly like yours in each then you would accept Katja’s argument?
Not sure of the relevance of eternal inflation. However, I think I’ve realized where my argument went astray and have updated the post accordingly. Let me know if we still disagree.