I’m not sure if we have a genuine disagreement, or if we’re disputing definitions. So without talking about eudaimonic anything, which of the following do you disagree with, if any?
What we want should be the basis for a better future, but the better future probably won’t look much like what we currently want.
CEV might point to something like uploading or dramatic intelligence enhancement that lots of people won’t currently want, though by definition it would be part of their extrapolated preferences.
A fair share of the population will probably, if polled, actively oppose what CEV says we really want.
It seems unlikely that the optimal intelligence level is the current one, but some people would probably oppose alteration to their intelligence. This isn’t a question of “Don’t I have to want to be as intelligent as possible?” so much as “Is what I currently want a good guide to my extrapolated volition?”
I’m not sure if we have a genuine disagreement, or if we’re disputing definitions. So without talking about eudaimonic anything, which of the following do you disagree with, if any?
What we want should be the basis for a better future, but the better future probably won’t look much like what we currently want.
CEV might point to something like uploading or dramatic intelligence enhancement that lots of people won’t currently want, though by definition it would be part of their extrapolated preferences.
A fair share of the population will probably, if polled, actively oppose what CEV says we really want.
It seems unlikely that the optimal intelligence level is the current one, but some people would probably oppose alteration to their intelligence. This isn’t a question of “Don’t I have to want to be as intelligent as possible?” so much as “Is what I currently want a good guide to my extrapolated volition?”
Most of these give me the heebie-jeebies, but I don’t really disagree with them.