The same way, there are observations that are strictly more likely to occur if we’re in a simulation than if not.
This is not true in general. This is true for some particular kinds of simulations (e.g. your link says “we assume that our universe is an early numerical simulation with unimproved Wilson fermion discretization”), but not all of them.
Let’s rephrase: our expectations are different conditioning on simulation than on ~simulation.
The probability distribution of observations over possible simulation types is different from the probability distribution of observations over possible physics laws. If you disagree, then you need to hold that exactly the right kinds of simulations (with opposite effects) have exactly the right kind of probability to cancel out the effects of “particular kinds of simulations”. That seems a very strong claim which needs defending. Otherwise, there do exist possible observations which would be Bayesian evidence for simulation.
our expectations are different conditioning on simulation than on ~simulation
I don’t think mine are.
The probability distribution of observations over possible simulation types is different from the probability distribution of observations over possible physics laws.
That is a content-free statement. You have no idea about either of the distributions, about what “possible simulation types” there might be, or what “possible physics laws” might be.
there do exist possible observations which would be Bayesian evidence for simulation
Well, barring things which actually break the simulation (e.g. an alien teenager appearing in the sky and saying that his parents are making him shut off this sim, so goodbye all y’all), can you give me an example?
Any of the things proposed in papers with the same aims of the one I linked above. The reason I’m not giving specifics is because I don’t know enough of the technical points made to discuss them properly.
I wouldn’t be the one making the observations, physicists would, so my observation is “physicists announce a test which shows that we are likely to be living in a simulation” and it gets vetted by people with technical knowledge, replicated with better p-values, all the recent Nobel Physics prize winners look over it and confirm, etc. (Note: I’m explicitly outlawing something which uses philosophy/anthropics/”thinking about physics”. Only actual experiments. Although I’d expect only good ones to get past the bar I set, anyway, so that may not be needed.) I couldn’t judge myself whether the results mean anything, so I’d rely on consensus of physicists.
Using that observation: are you really telling me that your P(physicists announce finding evidence of simulation| simulation) == P(physicists announce finding evidence of simulation| ~simulation)?
I wouldn’t be the one making the observations, physicists would
Ugh, so all you have in an argument to authority? A few centuries ago the scientists had a consensus that God exists. And?
are you really telling me that your P(physicists announce finding evidence of simulation| simulation) == P(physicists announce finding evidence of simulation| ~simulation)?
No, I’m telling you that “evidence of simulation” is an expression which doesn’t mean anything to me.
To go back to Alsadius’ point, how are you going to distinguish between “this is a feature of the simulation” and “this is how the physical world works”?
I gave my observation, which is basically deferring to physicists.
“evidence of simulation” may not mean anything to you, but surely “physicists announce finding evidence of simulation” means something to you? Could you give an example of something that could happen where you wouldn’t be sure whether it counted as “physicists announce finding evidence of simulation”?
how are you going to distinguish between “this is a feature of the simulation” and “this is how the physical world works”
Right now, as I’m not trained in physics, I’d defer to the consensus of experts. I expect someone who wrote those kinds of papers would have a better answer for you.
Or is your problem of defining “evidence of simulation” something you’d complain about even if real experts used that in a paper?
Which is why I laid out a bunch of additional steps needed above:
my observation is “physicists announce a test which shows that we are likely to be living in a simulation” and it gets vetted by people with technical knowledge, replicated with better p-values, all the recent Nobel Physics prize winners look over it and confirm, etc.
You seem to be taking parts of my argument out of context.
I do not subscribe to the esoteric-knowledge-available-only-to-high-priests view of science.
Me neither, but I’m trying to use a hypothetical paper as a proxy because I’m not well versed enough to talk about specifics. On some level you have to accept arguments from authority. (Or do you either reject quantum mechanics or have seen evidence yourself?) Imagine that simulation was as well established in physics as quantum mechanics is now. I find it very hard to say that that occurrence is completely orthogonal to the truth of simulation.
On some level you have to accept arguments from authority.
The problem is that you offer nothing but an argument from authority.
have seen evidence yourself?
Well, of course I have. The computer I use to type this words relies on QM to work, the dual wave-particle nature of light is quite apparent in digital photography, NMR machines in hospitals do work, etc.
In any case, let me express my position clearly.
I do not believe it possible to prove we’re NOT living in a simulation.
The question is whether it’s possible to prove we ARE living in a simulation is complex. Part of the complexity involves the meaning of “simulation” in this context. For example, if we assume that there is an omnipotent Creator of the universe, can we call this universe “a simulation”? It might be possible to test whether we are in a specific kind of simulation (see the paper you linked to), but I don’t think it’s possible to test whether we are in some, unspecified, unknown simulation.
My position is that it is possible for us to get both Bayesian evidence for and against simulation. I was not talking at all about “proof” in the sense you seem to use it.
If it’s possible to get evidence for a “specific kind of simulation”, then lacking that evidence is weak evidence against simulation. If we test many different possible simulation hypotheses and don’t find anything, that’s slightly stronger evidence. It’s inconsistent to say that we can’t prove ~simulation but can prove simulation.
The computer I use to type this words relies on QM to work, the dual wave-particle nature of light is quite apparent in digital photography, NMR machines in hospitals do work, etc.
I’m curious if you understand QM well enough to say that computers wouldn’t work without it. Is there no possible design for computers in classical physics that we would recognize as computer? Couldn’t QM be false and all these things work differently, and you’d have no way of knowing? Whatever you say, I doubt there are no areas in your life where you just rely on authority without understanding the subject. If not physics, then medicine, or something else.
Is there no possible design for computers in classical physics that we would recognize as computer?
Of course there is—from Babbage to the mechanical calculators or the mid-XX century. But I didn’t mean computers in general—I meant the specific computer that I’m typing these words on, the computer that relies on semiconductor microchips.
This is not true in general. This is true for some particular kinds of simulations (e.g. your link says “we assume that our universe is an early numerical simulation with unimproved Wilson fermion discretization”), but not all of them.
Let’s rephrase: our expectations are different conditioning on simulation than on ~simulation.
The probability distribution of observations over possible simulation types is different from the probability distribution of observations over possible physics laws. If you disagree, then you need to hold that exactly the right kinds of simulations (with opposite effects) have exactly the right kind of probability to cancel out the effects of “particular kinds of simulations”. That seems a very strong claim which needs defending. Otherwise, there do exist possible observations which would be Bayesian evidence for simulation.
I don’t think mine are.
That is a content-free statement. You have no idea about either of the distributions, about what “possible simulation types” there might be, or what “possible physics laws” might be.
Well, barring things which actually break the simulation (e.g. an alien teenager appearing in the sky and saying that his parents are making him shut off this sim, so goodbye all y’all), can you give me an example?
Any of the things proposed in papers with the same aims of the one I linked above. The reason I’m not giving specifics is because I don’t know enough of the technical points made to discuss them properly.
I wouldn’t be the one making the observations, physicists would, so my observation is “physicists announce a test which shows that we are likely to be living in a simulation” and it gets vetted by people with technical knowledge, replicated with better p-values, all the recent Nobel Physics prize winners look over it and confirm, etc. (Note: I’m explicitly outlawing something which uses philosophy/anthropics/”thinking about physics”. Only actual experiments. Although I’d expect only good ones to get past the bar I set, anyway, so that may not be needed.) I couldn’t judge myself whether the results mean anything, so I’d rely on consensus of physicists.
Using that observation: are you really telling me that your P(physicists announce finding evidence of simulation| simulation) == P(physicists announce finding evidence of simulation| ~simulation)?
Ugh, so all you have in an argument to authority? A few centuries ago the scientists had a consensus that God exists. And?
No, I’m telling you that “evidence of simulation” is an expression which doesn’t mean anything to me.
To go back to Alsadius’ point, how are you going to distinguish between “this is a feature of the simulation” and “this is how the physical world works”?
I gave my observation, which is basically deferring to physicists.
“evidence of simulation” may not mean anything to you, but surely “physicists announce finding evidence of simulation” means something to you? Could you give an example of something that could happen where you wouldn’t be sure whether it counted as “physicists announce finding evidence of simulation”?
Right now, as I’m not trained in physics, I’d defer to the consensus of experts. I expect someone who wrote those kinds of papers would have a better answer for you.
Or is your problem of defining “evidence of simulation” something you’d complain about even if real experts used that in a paper?
Yes, it means “somebody wanted publicity” (don’t think it would get as far as grants).
Yes, of course. I do not subscribe to the esoteric-knowledge-available-only-to-high-priests view of science.
Which is why I laid out a bunch of additional steps needed above:
You seem to be taking parts of my argument out of context.
Me neither, but I’m trying to use a hypothetical paper as a proxy because I’m not well versed enough to talk about specifics. On some level you have to accept arguments from authority. (Or do you either reject quantum mechanics or have seen evidence yourself?) Imagine that simulation was as well established in physics as quantum mechanics is now. I find it very hard to say that that occurrence is completely orthogonal to the truth of simulation.
The problem is that you offer nothing but an argument from authority.
Well, of course I have. The computer I use to type this words relies on QM to work, the dual wave-particle nature of light is quite apparent in digital photography, NMR machines in hospitals do work, etc.
In any case, let me express my position clearly.
I do not believe it possible to prove we’re NOT living in a simulation.
The question is whether it’s possible to prove we ARE living in a simulation is complex. Part of the complexity involves the meaning of “simulation” in this context. For example, if we assume that there is an omnipotent Creator of the universe, can we call this universe “a simulation”? It might be possible to test whether we are in a specific kind of simulation (see the paper you linked to), but I don’t think it’s possible to test whether we are in some, unspecified, unknown simulation.
My position is that it is possible for us to get both Bayesian evidence for and against simulation. I was not talking at all about “proof” in the sense you seem to use it.
If it’s possible to get evidence for a “specific kind of simulation”, then lacking that evidence is weak evidence against simulation. If we test many different possible simulation hypotheses and don’t find anything, that’s slightly stronger evidence. It’s inconsistent to say that we can’t prove ~simulation but can prove simulation.
I’m curious if you understand QM well enough to say that computers wouldn’t work without it. Is there no possible design for computers in classical physics that we would recognize as computer? Couldn’t QM be false and all these things work differently, and you’d have no way of knowing? Whatever you say, I doubt there are no areas in your life where you just rely on authority without understanding the subject. If not physics, then medicine, or something else.
Of course there is—from Babbage to the mechanical calculators or the mid-XX century. But I didn’t mean computers in general—I meant the specific computer that I’m typing these words on, the computer that relies on semiconductor microchips.
How do you know your computer relies on semiconductor microchips? Could you explain to me why semiconductor microchips require QM to work?
I looked :-)
See e.g. this.