This post explores the hypothetical/assertion that “an ideal agent shouldn’t incentivize other agents to lie to it, by believing their lies”.
However, it turns out that the costs of being completely inexploitable so are higher than the costs of being (at least somewhat) exploitable.
It all adds up to normality: there is a rational reason we, at least occasionally, believe what other people say. The assertion above has been disproven.
Have I correctly understood what you are saying?
(I apologize if this conclusion is meant to be obvious; I found myself somewhat confused whether that indeed is the conclusion, so I would like to verify my understanding)
Yes, that’s the intended point, and probably a better way of phrasing it. I am concluding against the initial assertion, and claiming that it does make sense to trust people in some situations even though you’re implementing a strategy that isn’t completely immune to exploitation.
Interesting post, thank you!
So, just to be clear.
This post explores the hypothetical/assertion that “an ideal agent shouldn’t incentivize other agents to lie to it, by believing their lies”.
However, it turns out that the costs of being completely inexploitable so are higher than the costs of being (at least somewhat) exploitable.
It all adds up to normality: there is a rational reason we, at least occasionally, believe what other people say. The assertion above has been disproven.
Have I correctly understood what you are saying?
(I apologize if this conclusion is meant to be obvious; I found myself somewhat confused whether that indeed is the conclusion, so I would like to verify my understanding)
Yes, that’s the intended point, and probably a better way of phrasing it. I am concluding against the initial assertion, and claiming that it does make sense to trust people in some situations even though you’re implementing a strategy that isn’t completely immune to exploitation.