Put the keys to the nuclear weapons in the hands of people who have been conditioned to retaliate as part of their job.
In terms of general ways of precommitting, there are a few options:
Get someone to punish you if you do the thing you don’t want to do. For example, you could sign a contract that says you’ll have to pay a large fee if you don’t bargain a car salesman down to a certain price—now they know that they must either sell it to you at that price or walk away, and so you win if that price is still profitable for them.
Start doing the stuff you want people to think you’ll do, so that its cost is reduced if you have to make good on the threat. For example, you could position your army near the border to make the neighboring country stop stealing your cows.
Put control in the hands of a third person who does have an incentive to carry out the threat. For example, when you’re acquiring a small company, don’t send the CEO, instead hire an independent negotiator who only gets paid if they bargain them down to a certain price. The CEO might not be willing to just walk away from the deal, but an independent negotiator can, and so the small company is more likely to capitulate.
Put the keys to the nuclear weapons in the hands of people who have been conditioned to retaliate as part of their job.
In terms of general ways of precommitting, there are a few options:
Get someone to punish you if you do the thing you don’t want to do. For example, you could sign a contract that says you’ll have to pay a large fee if you don’t bargain a car salesman down to a certain price—now they know that they must either sell it to you at that price or walk away, and so you win if that price is still profitable for them.
Start doing the stuff you want people to think you’ll do, so that its cost is reduced if you have to make good on the threat. For example, you could position your army near the border to make the neighboring country stop stealing your cows.
Put control in the hands of a third person who does have an incentive to carry out the threat. For example, when you’re acquiring a small company, don’t send the CEO, instead hire an independent negotiator who only gets paid if they bargain them down to a certain price. The CEO might not be willing to just walk away from the deal, but an independent negotiator can, and so the small company is more likely to capitulate.
Also, rip the steering wheel off and chug a fifth of whisky.
True. But this is only good as a straight commitment, not a conditional commitment, which is what’s necessary for most kinds of coercion.