Doesn’t need to affect your decisions to have a psychological impact.
EDIT (x2): Imagine we found out we’re surrounded by Cthulhu-type monsters on all sides, but luckily we’d be certain they can’t causally interact with us. Business as usual, then? Also, wouldn’t that imply e.g. that if a relative of yours on a spaceship were going over the cosmological horizon, then “relative = dead, stopped existing” and “relative just forever outside my reach” would be considered identical, because both reduce to the same decision tree? I’d disagree with that, too. Different states of mind can lead to the same actions, yet the difference may matter epiphenomenologically.
Doesn’t need to affect your decisions to have a psychological impact.
At that point I don’t see why you’d call it “implications”. What are the implications of a spider getting thrown on your face? You get lots of fear, but it doesn’t have implications for ideal morality and rationality besides “don’t throw spiders on people’s faces”.
I don’t want to hurt your sanity, but we’ve always been surrounded by Cthulhu-type monsters on all sides, and they can’t interact with us. And yeah, business as usual on that one.
And recall, my comparison was not between really existing and being dead—it was between definitely existing with some density, and probably existing with some probability. If your relative definitely exists with a density of 1 in that patch of spacetime over there (unit is “relatives per patch of spacetime you can point to”), then the comparison is to a case where they probably exist with probability 1, which is kinda boring :P
I agree that state of mind is important. But that’s always important, and thus not very informative :)
Doesn’t need to affect your decisions to have a psychological impact.
EDIT (x2): Imagine we found out we’re surrounded by Cthulhu-type monsters on all sides, but luckily we’d be certain they can’t causally interact with us. Business as usual, then? Also, wouldn’t that imply e.g. that if a relative of yours on a spaceship were going over the cosmological horizon, then “relative = dead, stopped existing” and “relative just forever outside my reach” would be considered identical, because both reduce to the same decision tree? I’d disagree with that, too. Different states of mind can lead to the same actions, yet the difference may matter epiphenomenologically.
At that point I don’t see why you’d call it “implications”. What are the implications of a spider getting thrown on your face? You get lots of fear, but it doesn’t have implications for ideal morality and rationality besides “don’t throw spiders on people’s faces”.
“implications” has too many implications...
I don’t want to hurt your sanity, but we’ve always been surrounded by Cthulhu-type monsters on all sides, and they can’t interact with us. And yeah, business as usual on that one.
And recall, my comparison was not between really existing and being dead—it was between definitely existing with some density, and probably existing with some probability. If your relative definitely exists with a density of 1 in that patch of spacetime over there (unit is “relatives per patch of spacetime you can point to”), then the comparison is to a case where they probably exist with probability 1, which is kinda boring :P
I agree that state of mind is important. But that’s always important, and thus not very informative :)