My utility from eating meat is b(X=1)
My utility from the world not being destroyed is Y
So...
Utility = X + E[Y|X=1]
vs.
Utility = E[Y| X=0]
Obviously you’re able to disagree with my model. But in my self-consistent model of the world the benefit I get from eating meat is greater than the utility I achieve from lowering the likelihood the world is destroyed (in any given timeframe) by not eating meat.
I strongly suspect you will have a hard time convincing me I’m wrong without appealing to moral imperatives. Obviously there isn’t some mathematically elegant and clearly distinct line between rationality and moral imperative, but hey, if there was Less Wrong probably wouldn’t exist.
My utility from eating meat is b(X=1) My utility from the world not being destroyed is Y So...
Utility = X + E[Y|X=1] vs. Utility = E[Y| X=0]
Obviously you’re able to disagree with my model. But in my self-consistent model of the world the benefit I get from eating meat is greater than the utility I achieve from lowering the likelihood the world is destroyed (in any given timeframe) by not eating meat.
I strongly suspect you will have a hard time convincing me I’m wrong without appealing to moral imperatives. Obviously there isn’t some mathematically elegant and clearly distinct line between rationality and moral imperative, but hey, if there was Less Wrong probably wouldn’t exist.