Okay, so I don’t have much time to write this so bear with the quality but I thought I would say one or two things of the Yudkowsky and Wolfram discussion as someone who’s at least spent 10 deep work hours trying to understand Wolfram’s persepective of the world.
With some of the older floating megaminds like Wolfram and Friston who are also phycisists you have the problem that they get very caught up in their own ontology.
From the perspective of a phycisist morality could be seen as an emergent property of physical laws.
Wolfram likes to think of things in terms of computational reducibility, a way this can be described in the agent foundations frame is that the agent modelling the environment will be able to predict the world dependent on it’s own speed. It’s like some sort of agent-environment relativity where the information processing capacity determines the space of possible ontologies. An example of this being how if we have an intelligence that’s a lot closer to operating at the speed of light, the visual field might not be a useful vector of experience to model.
Another way to say it is that there’s only modelling and modelled. An intuition from this frame is that there’s only differently good models of understanding specific things and so the concept of general intelligence becomes weird here.
IMO this is like the problem of the first 2 hours of the conversation, to some extent Wolfram doesn’t engage with the huamn perspective as much nor any ought questions. He has a very physics floating megamind perspective.
Now, I personally believe there’s something interesting to be said about an alternative hypothesis to the individual superintelligence that comes from theories of collective intelligence. If a superorganism is better at modelling something than an individual organism is then it should outcompete the others in this system. I’m personally bullish on the idea that there are certain configurations of humans and general trust-verifying networks that can outcompete individual AGI as the outer alignment functions would enforce the inner functions enough.
Okay, so I don’t have much time to write this so bear with the quality but I thought I would say one or two things of the Yudkowsky and Wolfram discussion as someone who’s at least spent 10 deep work hours trying to understand Wolfram’s persepective of the world.
With some of the older floating megaminds like Wolfram and Friston who are also phycisists you have the problem that they get very caught up in their own ontology.
From the perspective of a phycisist morality could be seen as an emergent property of physical laws.
Wolfram likes to think of things in terms of computational reducibility, a way this can be described in the agent foundations frame is that the agent modelling the environment will be able to predict the world dependent on it’s own speed. It’s like some sort of agent-environment relativity where the information processing capacity determines the space of possible ontologies. An example of this being how if we have an intelligence that’s a lot closer to operating at the speed of light, the visual field might not be a useful vector of experience to model.
Another way to say it is that there’s only modelling and modelled. An intuition from this frame is that there’s only differently good models of understanding specific things and so the concept of general intelligence becomes weird here.
IMO this is like the problem of the first 2 hours of the conversation, to some extent Wolfram doesn’t engage with the huamn perspective as much nor any ought questions. He has a very physics floating megamind perspective.
Now, I personally believe there’s something interesting to be said about an alternative hypothesis to the individual superintelligence that comes from theories of collective intelligence. If a superorganism is better at modelling something than an individual organism is then it should outcompete the others in this system. I’m personally bullish on the idea that there are certain configurations of humans and general trust-verifying networks that can outcompete individual AGI as the outer alignment functions would enforce the inner functions enough.