There have been “Nuclear first-use and threats or advocacy thereof” and those are easy to condemn. But as far as I know they are coming unilaterally from the Russian side and already being widely condemned by those not on the Russian side. But it sounds like you are looking for some broader consensus to condemn escalation on both sides.
Unfortunately neither this post nor the open letter you linked give any specifics about what other behaviours you are asking us to condemn. I’m reluctant to risk endorsing a false-equivalence argument by signing a blank check.
Is blowing up the Kerch bridge escalatory? Is Arestovich trolling the occupiers to sap their morale and bolster the morale of the defenders escalatory? I’m not qualified to determine whether the tactical or psychological benefit is justified by the escalatory risk of these sorts of actions and in the Kerch example, we don’t even know if it was done by the Ukrainian government, provocateurs, or sympathizers acting independently.
I agree that it’s not a binary choice between appeasement and escalation, and I am very curious about the non-appeasing de-escalation strategies you allude to. That’s what we should be brainstorming and what you should lead with in your letter for it to be convincing.
I agree that specifics would be useful. It’s bad to be too vague to be wrong. The more vague an open letter happens to be the easier it is to ignore it.
As it stands the effects of the letter likely don’t go beyond signaling because in the abstract anyone can agree with it, but that’s not going to change anyone’s actions.
When it comes to nuclear first use, the US does threaten Iran with a nuclear first strike by saying:
US is “prepared to use all elements of its national power” to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
Nuclear first strikes capability is one element of US national power. As far as I know, past attempts to get the US to explicitely rule out using a nuclear first strike against Iran and North Korea always failed.
If you actually want the US to stop making nuclear first strike threats, being explicit about the threads against Iran not being okay would be taking a stance. You would likely get some opposition for taking the stance, but at least it’s something concrete.
When it comes to “reckless escalation” I find it likely that neither the US nor Ukraine would say they engage in reckless escalation. If you want them to change what they are doing you likely need to be more concrete.
There have been “Nuclear first-use and threats or advocacy thereof” and those are easy to condemn. But as far as I know they are coming unilaterally from the Russian side and already being widely condemned by those not on the Russian side. But it sounds like you are looking for some broader consensus to condemn escalation on both sides.
Unfortunately neither this post nor the open letter you linked give any specifics about what other behaviours you are asking us to condemn. I’m reluctant to risk endorsing a false-equivalence argument by signing a blank check.
Is blowing up the Kerch bridge escalatory? Is Arestovich trolling the occupiers to sap their morale and bolster the morale of the defenders escalatory? I’m not qualified to determine whether the tactical or psychological benefit is justified by the escalatory risk of these sorts of actions and in the Kerch example, we don’t even know if it was done by the Ukrainian government, provocateurs, or sympathizers acting independently.
I agree that it’s not a binary choice between appeasement and escalation, and I am very curious about the non-appeasing de-escalation strategies you allude to. That’s what we should be brainstorming and what you should lead with in your letter for it to be convincing.
I agree that specifics would be useful. It’s bad to be too vague to be wrong. The more vague an open letter happens to be the easier it is to ignore it.
As it stands the effects of the letter likely don’t go beyond signaling because in the abstract anyone can agree with it, but that’s not going to change anyone’s actions.
When it comes to nuclear first use, the US does threaten Iran with a nuclear first strike by saying:
Nuclear first strikes capability is one element of US national power. As far as I know, past attempts to get the US to explicitely rule out using a nuclear first strike against Iran and North Korea always failed.
If you actually want the US to stop making nuclear first strike threats, being explicit about the threads against Iran not being okay would be taking a stance. You would likely get some opposition for taking the stance, but at least it’s something concrete.
When it comes to “reckless escalation” I find it likely that neither the US nor Ukraine would say they engage in reckless escalation. If you want them to change what they are doing you likely need to be more concrete.