This article got me thinking about a few things. Centrally, there is no necessary condition on things which really do have goal directed behaviour to maximise. Revealed preference theory in economics effectively identifies the choices people make with their preference. Thus humans are seen as maximisers of their preferences in an almost trivial sense, if preferences are also assumed to fall under a ranking (another thing economists assume). Yet this goal orientated explanation in terms of rationality could be wrong for two reasons: firstly, the choices could not be goal orientated—they could simply be behaviour with no goal-based cause—or they could be the result of a different goal, which may not maximise. The first possibility is discussed in the article. The second is not, but is interesting, as the second condition could be met for many reasons. If I went to see a movie, a believer in revealed preference theory may conclude I preferred seeing that movie over all else that night. But perhaps I went to the wrong movie by mistake. Perhaps I was forced to go to the movie by gunpoint, and preferred to be at home and safe. Perhaps I really preferred to go to see a play, but hadn’t really reflected on my preferences very hard. Or perhaps I went to the movie for a friend who wanted to see it with me, but in fact I actually would have preferred to not go.
In some of those cases, we might explain the supposed problem away by reflecting that in those particular circumstances, my preference was in fact to go to the movie; but had the circumstances been different I would have preferred otherwise. For instance, at gunpoint, in those circumstances, I wouldn’t prefer to walk home, as I would get shot. However, this counterargument presumes we can’t preferences over counterfactual situations, which we evidently can have. Also, it isn’t very useful to the economist, who would like to conclude that preferences are stable, as so that the choice a person makes at one time will be repeated in the future.
This article got me thinking about a few things. Centrally, there is no necessary condition on things which really do have goal directed behaviour to maximise. Revealed preference theory in economics effectively identifies the choices people make with their preference. Thus humans are seen as maximisers of their preferences in an almost trivial sense, if preferences are also assumed to fall under a ranking (another thing economists assume). Yet this goal orientated explanation in terms of rationality could be wrong for two reasons: firstly, the choices could not be goal orientated—they could simply be behaviour with no goal-based cause—or they could be the result of a different goal, which may not maximise. The first possibility is discussed in the article. The second is not, but is interesting, as the second condition could be met for many reasons. If I went to see a movie, a believer in revealed preference theory may conclude I preferred seeing that movie over all else that night. But perhaps I went to the wrong movie by mistake. Perhaps I was forced to go to the movie by gunpoint, and preferred to be at home and safe. Perhaps I really preferred to go to see a play, but hadn’t really reflected on my preferences very hard. Or perhaps I went to the movie for a friend who wanted to see it with me, but in fact I actually would have preferred to not go.
In some of those cases, we might explain the supposed problem away by reflecting that in those particular circumstances, my preference was in fact to go to the movie; but had the circumstances been different I would have preferred otherwise. For instance, at gunpoint, in those circumstances, I wouldn’t prefer to walk home, as I would get shot. However, this counterargument presumes we can’t preferences over counterfactual situations, which we evidently can have. Also, it isn’t very useful to the economist, who would like to conclude that preferences are stable, as so that the choice a person makes at one time will be repeated in the future.