But I should not make decisions about individual members of Group X based on the statistical trend associated with Group X [...]
Really? I don’t think it’s possible to function in any realistic human society without constantly making decisions about individuals based on the statistical trends associated with various groups to which they happen to belong (a.k.a. “statistical discrimination”). Acquiring perfectly detailed information about every individual you ever interact with is simply not possible given the basic constraints faced by humans.
Of course, certain forms of statistical discrimination are viewed as an immensely important moral issue nowadays, while others are seen simply as normal common sense. It’s a fascinating question how and why exactly various forms of it happen (or fail) to acquire a deep moral dimension. But in any case, a blanket condemnation of all forms of statistical discrimination is an attitude incompatible with any realistic human way of life.
The “deep moral dimension” generally applies to group memberships that aren’t (perceived to be) chosen: sex, gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion to a lesser extent.
These are the kinds of “Group X” to which I was referring. Discriminating against someone because they majored in Drama in college or believe in homeopathy are not even remotely equivalent to racism, sexism, and the like.
The well documented discrimination against short men and ugly people and the (more debatable) discrimination against the socially inept and those whose behaviour and learning style does not conform to the compliant workers that schools are largely structured to produce are examples of discrimination that appears to receive less attention and concern.
Opposition to discrimination doesn’t just happen. It has to be organized and promoted for an extended period before there’s a effect.
Afaik, that promotion typically has to include convincing people in the discriminated group that things can be different and that opposing discrimination is worth the risks and effort. In some cases, it also includes convincing them that they don’t deserve to be mistreated.
The “deep moral dimension” generally applies to group memberships that aren’t (perceived to be) chosen: sex, gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion to a lesser extent.
This is not an accurate description of the present situation. To take the most blatant example, every country discriminates between its own citizens and foreigners, and also between foreigners from different countries (some can visit freely, while others need hard to get visas). This state of affairs is considered completely normal and uncontroversial, even though it involves a tremendous amount of discrimination based on group memberships that are a mere accident of birth.
Thus, there are clearly some additional factors involved in the moralization of other forms of discrimination, and the fascinating question is what exactly they are. The question is especially puzzling considering that religion is, in most cases, much easier to change than nationality, and yet the former makes your above list, while the latter doesn’t—so the story about choice vs. accident of birth definitely doesn’t hold water.
I’m also puzzled by your mention of class. Discrimination by class is definitely not a morally sensitive issue nowadays the way sex or race is. On the contrary, success in life is nowadays measured mostly by one’s ability to distance and insulate oneself from the lower classes by being able to afford living in low-class-free neighborhoods and joining higher social circles. Even when it comes to you personally, I can’t imagine that you would have exactly the same reaction when approached by a homeless panhandler and by someone decent-looking.
Discrimination by class is definitely not a morally sensitive issue nowadays the way sex or race is. On the contrary, success in life is nowadays measured mostly by one’s ability to distance and insulate oneself from the lower classes
Without disagreeing much with your comment, I have to point out that this is a non sequitur. Moral sensitivity has nothing to do with (ordinary) actions. Among countries where the second sentence is true, there are both ones where the first is true and ones where the first is false. I don’t know so much about countries where the second sentence is false.
As to religion, in places where people care about it enough to discriminate, changing it will probably alienate one’s family, so it is very costly to change, although technically possible. Also, in many places, religion is a codeword for ethnic groups, so it can’t be changed (eg, Catholics in US 1850-1950).
You’re right that my comment was imprecise, in that I didn’t specify to which societies it applies. I had in mind the modern Western societies, and especially the English-speaking countries. In other places, things can indeed be very different with regards to all the mentioned issues.
However, regarding your comment:
Moral sensitivity has nothing to do with (ordinary) actions.
That’s not really true. People are indeed apt to enthusiastically extol moral principles in the abstract while at the same them violating them whenever compliance would be too costly. However, even when such violations are rampant, these acts are still different from those that don’t involve any such hypocritical violations, or those that violate only weaker and less significant principles.
And in practice, when we observe people’s acts and attitudes that involve their feeling of superiority over lower classes and their desire to distance themselves from them, it looks quite different from analogous behaviors with respect to e.g. race or sex. The latter sorts of statements and acts normally involve far more caution, evasion, obfuscation, and rationalization. To take a concrete example, few people would see any problem with recommending a house by saying that it’s located in “a nice middle-class neighborhood”—but imagine the shocked reactions if someone praised it by talking about the ethnic/racial composition of the neighborhood loudly and explicitly, even if the former description might in practice serve as (among other things) a codeword for the latter.
The “deep moral dimension” generally applies to group memberships that aren’t (perceived to be) chosen: sex, gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion to a lesser extent.
But you still discriminate based on sex, gender, race, class, sexual orientation and religion every day. You don’t try to talk about sports with every girl you meet, you safely assume that they probably aren’t interested until you receive evidence to the contrary. But if you meet a guy, then talking about sports moves higher on the list of conversation topics just because he’s a guy.
Well, I actually try to avoid talking about sports entirely, because I find the topic totally uninteresting.
But! That is mere nitpicking, and the thrust of your argument is correct. I can only say that like all human beings I regularly fail to adhere to my own moral standards, and that this does not make those standards worthless.
Well, I actually try to avoid talking about sports entirely, because I find the topic totally uninteresting.
For some reason I expected that answer. ;)
I can only say that like all human beings I regularly fail to adhere to my own moral standards, and that this does not make those standards worthless.
I find it odd that you still hold on to “not statistically discriminating” as a value. What about it do you think is immoral? (I’m not trying to be condescending here, I’m genuinely curious)
I value not statistically discriminating (on the basis of unchosen characteristics or group memberships) because it is an incredibly unpleasant phenomenon to experience. As a white American man I suffer proportionally much less from the phenomenon than do most people, and even the small piece of it that I pick up from being bisexual sucks.
It’s not a terminal value, necessarily, but in practice it tends to act like one.
I can only say that like all human beings I regularly fail to adhere to my own moral standards, and that this does not make those standards worthless.
If following your moral standards is impractical, maybe those standards aren’t quite right in the first place.
It is a common mistake for idealists to choose their morality without reference to practical realities. A better search plan would be to find all the practical options, and then pick whichever of those is the most moral.
If you spare women you meet from discussion of sports (or insert whatever interest you have that exhibits average sex differences) until she expresses interest in the subject, you have not failed any reasonable moral standards.
It is a common mistake for idealists to choose their morality without reference to practical realities. A better search plan would be to find all the practical options, and then pick whichever of those is the most moral.
Most moral by what standard? You’re just passing the buck here.
Moral according to your standards. I’m just suggesting a different order of operation: understanding the practicalities first, and then trying to find which of the practical options you judge most moral.
But those standards are moral standards. If you’re suggesting that one should just choose the most moral practical option, how is that any different from consequentialism?
Your first comment sounded like you were suggesting that people should choose the most moral practical standard.
If you spare women you meet from discussion of sports (or insert whatever interest you have that exhibits average sex differences) until she expresses interest in the subject, you have not failed any reasonable moral standards.
Well, until you factor in the unfortunate tendency of women to be attracted to men who are indifferent to their interests :-P
WrongBot:
Really? I don’t think it’s possible to function in any realistic human society without constantly making decisions about individuals based on the statistical trends associated with various groups to which they happen to belong (a.k.a. “statistical discrimination”). Acquiring perfectly detailed information about every individual you ever interact with is simply not possible given the basic constraints faced by humans.
Of course, certain forms of statistical discrimination are viewed as an immensely important moral issue nowadays, while others are seen simply as normal common sense. It’s a fascinating question how and why exactly various forms of it happen (or fail) to acquire a deep moral dimension. But in any case, a blanket condemnation of all forms of statistical discrimination is an attitude incompatible with any realistic human way of life.
The “deep moral dimension” generally applies to group memberships that aren’t (perceived to be) chosen: sex, gender, race, class, sexual orientation, religion to a lesser extent.
These are the kinds of “Group X” to which I was referring. Discriminating against someone because they majored in Drama in college or believe in homeopathy are not even remotely equivalent to racism, sexism, and the like.
The well documented discrimination against short men and ugly people and the (more debatable) discrimination against the socially inept and those whose behaviour and learning style does not conform to the compliant workers that schools are largely structured to produce are examples of discrimination that appears to receive less attention and concern.
Opposition to discrimination doesn’t just happen. It has to be organized and promoted for an extended period before there’s a effect.
Afaik, that promotion typically has to include convincing people in the discriminated group that things can be different and that opposing discrimination is worth the risks and effort. In some cases, it also includes convincing them that they don’t deserve to be mistreated.
WrongBot:
This is not an accurate description of the present situation. To take the most blatant example, every country discriminates between its own citizens and foreigners, and also between foreigners from different countries (some can visit freely, while others need hard to get visas). This state of affairs is considered completely normal and uncontroversial, even though it involves a tremendous amount of discrimination based on group memberships that are a mere accident of birth.
Thus, there are clearly some additional factors involved in the moralization of other forms of discrimination, and the fascinating question is what exactly they are. The question is especially puzzling considering that religion is, in most cases, much easier to change than nationality, and yet the former makes your above list, while the latter doesn’t—so the story about choice vs. accident of birth definitely doesn’t hold water.
I’m also puzzled by your mention of class. Discrimination by class is definitely not a morally sensitive issue nowadays the way sex or race is. On the contrary, success in life is nowadays measured mostly by one’s ability to distance and insulate oneself from the lower classes by being able to afford living in low-class-free neighborhoods and joining higher social circles. Even when it comes to you personally, I can’t imagine that you would have exactly the same reaction when approached by a homeless panhandler and by someone decent-looking.
Without disagreeing much with your comment, I have to point out that this is a non sequitur. Moral sensitivity has nothing to do with (ordinary) actions. Among countries where the second sentence is true, there are both ones where the first is true and ones where the first is false. I don’t know so much about countries where the second sentence is false.
As to religion, in places where people care about it enough to discriminate, changing it will probably alienate one’s family, so it is very costly to change, although technically possible. Also, in many places, religion is a codeword for ethnic groups, so it can’t be changed (eg, Catholics in US 1850-1950).
You’re right that my comment was imprecise, in that I didn’t specify to which societies it applies. I had in mind the modern Western societies, and especially the English-speaking countries. In other places, things can indeed be very different with regards to all the mentioned issues.
However, regarding your comment:
That’s not really true. People are indeed apt to enthusiastically extol moral principles in the abstract while at the same them violating them whenever compliance would be too costly. However, even when such violations are rampant, these acts are still different from those that don’t involve any such hypocritical violations, or those that violate only weaker and less significant principles.
And in practice, when we observe people’s acts and attitudes that involve their feeling of superiority over lower classes and their desire to distance themselves from them, it looks quite different from analogous behaviors with respect to e.g. race or sex. The latter sorts of statements and acts normally involve far more caution, evasion, obfuscation, and rationalization. To take a concrete example, few people would see any problem with recommending a house by saying that it’s located in “a nice middle-class neighborhood”—but imagine the shocked reactions if someone praised it by talking about the ethnic/racial composition of the neighborhood loudly and explicitly, even if the former description might in practice serve as (among other things) a codeword for the latter.
But you still discriminate based on sex, gender, race, class, sexual orientation and religion every day. You don’t try to talk about sports with every girl you meet, you safely assume that they probably aren’t interested until you receive evidence to the contrary. But if you meet a guy, then talking about sports moves higher on the list of conversation topics just because he’s a guy.
Well, I actually try to avoid talking about sports entirely, because I find the topic totally uninteresting.
But! That is mere nitpicking, and the thrust of your argument is correct. I can only say that like all human beings I regularly fail to adhere to my own moral standards, and that this does not make those standards worthless.
For some reason I expected that answer. ;)
I find it odd that you still hold on to “not statistically discriminating” as a value. What about it do you think is immoral? (I’m not trying to be condescending here, I’m genuinely curious)
I value not statistically discriminating (on the basis of unchosen characteristics or group memberships) because it is an incredibly unpleasant phenomenon to experience. As a white American man I suffer proportionally much less from the phenomenon than do most people, and even the small piece of it that I pick up from being bisexual sucks.
It’s not a terminal value, necessarily, but in practice it tends to act like one.
If following your moral standards is impractical, maybe those standards aren’t quite right in the first place.
It is a common mistake for idealists to choose their morality without reference to practical realities. A better search plan would be to find all the practical options, and then pick whichever of those is the most moral.
If you spare women you meet from discussion of sports (or insert whatever interest you have that exhibits average sex differences) until she expresses interest in the subject, you have not failed any reasonable moral standards.
Most moral by what standard? You’re just passing the buck here.
Moral according to your standards. I’m just suggesting a different order of operation: understanding the practicalities first, and then trying to find which of the practical options you judge most moral.
But those standards are moral standards. If you’re suggesting that one should just choose the most moral practical option, how is that any different from consequentialism?
Your first comment sounded like you were suggesting that people should choose the most moral practical standard.
Well, until you factor in the unfortunate tendency of women to be attracted to men who are indifferent to their interests :-P
People don’t get to choose how intelligent they are.