It’s an exaggeration, but not far off. The information seems pretty damn fragile. From the linked thread: “The damage that is occurring—distortion of membranes, denaturation of proteins (very likely), disruption of signalling pathways. Just changing the exact localization of Ca microdomains within a synapse can wreak havoc, replacing the liquid completely? Not going to work.”
The counterarguments appear to be “but do we really need all that detail for a good-enough copy of the person?” Which is a “prove my negative”—the people arguing that don’t know either.
That argument seems to me to be based on an incredibly oversimplified view of what the recovery process would look like. It’s not going to involve restoring operation to the system.
It’s a double-edged negative… not only do we not know how good the copy will be, we don’t know how good is good enough. (Of course, if our standards for “good enough” are sufficiently low, then they can be satisfied by other people being born.)
Ultimately the cryonics argument is that the value to me of someone who meets my standards for being me existing in the future is so high that any increase, however small, in the chance of that happening has a higher expected value than anything else I could do with the resources consumed by post-mortem cryonic preservation of my brain (or at least, higher EV than many things I am currently doing with them, which I should therefore give up doing in favor of cryonics).
It’s an exaggeration, but not far off. The information seems pretty damn fragile. From the linked thread: “The damage that is occurring—distortion of membranes, denaturation of proteins (very likely), disruption of signalling pathways. Just changing the exact localization of Ca microdomains within a synapse can wreak havoc, replacing the liquid completely? Not going to work.”
The counterarguments appear to be “but do we really need all that detail for a good-enough copy of the person?” Which is a “prove my negative”—the people arguing that don’t know either.
That argument seems to me to be based on an incredibly oversimplified view of what the recovery process would look like. It’s not going to involve restoring operation to the system.
It’s a double-edged negative… not only do we not know how good the copy will be, we don’t know how good is good enough. (Of course, if our standards for “good enough” are sufficiently low, then they can be satisfied by other people being born.)
Ultimately the cryonics argument is that the value to me of someone who meets my standards for being me existing in the future is so high that any increase, however small, in the chance of that happening has a higher expected value than anything else I could do with the resources consumed by post-mortem cryonic preservation of my brain (or at least, higher EV than many things I am currently doing with them, which I should therefore give up doing in favor of cryonics).
Quite. We don’t know, so what are the chances?
They don’t need to be very high for cryonics to be an improvement on, y’know, definitely dying.
Cryonics is quite expensive. Success chance has to be non-negligible in order for cyronics to be worth the price.
Depends. What else are you going to spend your money on?
Anything else you like. You can even give it to others while you are alive or after you die.