Sure, and I think that’s a realistic assumption in most cases. But we could still come up with a scenario equivalent to pie-cutting. And the behavior of many voting systems in that scenario still seems problematic to me, and argues in favor of voting systems preferring compromise candidates to utilitarian candidates in some situations.
To be more concrete, if we assume diminishing returns, we could still get something like the pie-cutting scenario given by assuming the transfers are small relative to the total, and executed in a way that’s independent of wealth of the individuals (ie only based on their political party). I would defend my assertion that VSE is failing to capture a desirable feature of a voting system in that scenario.
Sure, and I think that’s a realistic assumption in most cases. But we could still come up with a scenario equivalent to pie-cutting. And the behavior of many voting systems in that scenario still seems problematic to me, and argues in favor of voting systems preferring compromise candidates to utilitarian candidates in some situations.
To be more concrete, if we assume diminishing returns, we could still get something like the pie-cutting scenario given by assuming the transfers are small relative to the total, and executed in a way that’s independent of wealth of the individuals (ie only based on their political party). I would defend my assertion that VSE is failing to capture a desirable feature of a voting system in that scenario.