I don’t think so; for instance, I don’t think Harsanyi’s solution is pareto-optimal—though I might be wrong about this, I’m not yet fully following it.
Well, if you think you can bargain to a Pareto-optimal solution, in a game with imperfect information, then I want to see that idea. Because with neither player having enough information to even recognize Pareto-optimality, I don’t see how their bargaining can bring them there.
Though perhaps you have a definition of Pareto-optimality in mind in which the optimality is “in the eye of the beholder”. Something like that might make sense. After all, in the course of bargaining, each party gains information about the state of the world, which may result in changes in their expected utility even without a change in objectively expected outcome.
Pareto-optimal in expected utility; and yes, “in the eye of the beholder”. The μSMBS I described http://lesswrong.com/lw/2xb/if_you_dont_know_the_name_of_the_game_just_tell/ are Pareto optimal (in the eyes of both players), even if they have different probability distributions over the games to be played (I put that in initially, then took it out as it made the post less readable).
Sounds like you are talking about Harsanyi’s Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (pdf link).
I don’t think so; for instance, I don’t think Harsanyi’s solution is pareto-optimal—though I might be wrong about this, I’m not yet fully following it.
Well, if you think you can bargain to a Pareto-optimal solution, in a game with imperfect information, then I want to see that idea. Because with neither player having enough information to even recognize Pareto-optimality, I don’t see how their bargaining can bring them there.
Though perhaps you have a definition of Pareto-optimality in mind in which the optimality is “in the eye of the beholder”. Something like that might make sense. After all, in the course of bargaining, each party gains information about the state of the world, which may result in changes in their expected utility even without a change in objectively expected outcome.
Pareto-optimal in expected utility; and yes, “in the eye of the beholder”. The μSMBS I described http://lesswrong.com/lw/2xb/if_you_dont_know_the_name_of_the_game_just_tell/ are Pareto optimal (in the eyes of both players), even if they have different probability distributions over the games to be played (I put that in initially, then took it out as it made the post less readable).