Given that I already explained that it makes sense to say the MW formulation contributes more probability to the equivalency class than Collapse formulations, it seems that your deconstruction is deconstructed.
I’ll be quite happy if, as a result of my post, popular opinion on LW shifts from thinking that “MWI deserves a higher prior degree of belief because it’s simpler, which makes a clear-cut case for Bayes over Science” to thinking that “MWI contributes more probability to the equivalence class than Collapse formulations”. Some people already have it clear, like you. Others don’t.
A note: I am pretty sure that paul’s claim (that MWI predicts more interference than typical QM) is false, and comes from not considering entanglement (which is understandable, because entanglement is hard). For example, if you collapsed the wavefunction of an electron in the two slit experiment improperly (by not keeping the state entangled after going through the slits), you would predict no interference.
This “entanglement” is just Many Worlds applied to a subsystem rather than the whole universe. If you allow the entire universe to be involved in the entanglement, you are really talking about Many Worlds by another name. If you only allow subsystems to be entangled, you will make different predictions than Many Worlds.
If you allow the entire universe to be involved in the entanglement, you are really talking about Many Worlds by another name.
The other name being “quantum mechanics.” :D
Yes, if the typical interpretation of QM said anything about not allowing n-particle entangled states, it would be inconsistent with the math of quantum mechanics. But it doesn’t, so it isn’t. (Note that some people have made their own interpretations that violate this, e.g. consciousness causes collapse. They were wrong.)
Yeah, I know. The post was about deconstructing Eliezer’s argument in favor of MWI, not about breaking the Solomonoff prior.
Given that I already explained that it makes sense to say the MW formulation contributes more probability to the equivalency class than Collapse formulations, it seems that your deconstruction is deconstructed.
I’ll be quite happy if, as a result of my post, popular opinion on LW shifts from thinking that “MWI deserves a higher prior degree of belief because it’s simpler, which makes a clear-cut case for Bayes over Science” to thinking that “MWI contributes more probability to the equivalence class than Collapse formulations”. Some people already have it clear, like you. Others don’t.
OK, as long as we remember that MWI and Collapse Formulations are not really in the same equivalence class, and that the implied invisible can have implications on utility.
A note: I am pretty sure that paul’s claim (that MWI predicts more interference than typical QM) is false, and comes from not considering entanglement (which is understandable, because entanglement is hard). For example, if you collapsed the wavefunction of an electron in the two slit experiment improperly (by not keeping the state entangled after going through the slits), you would predict no interference.
This “entanglement” is just Many Worlds applied to a subsystem rather than the whole universe. If you allow the entire universe to be involved in the entanglement, you are really talking about Many Worlds by another name. If you only allow subsystems to be entangled, you will make different predictions than Many Worlds.
The other name being “quantum mechanics.” :D
Yes, if the typical interpretation of QM said anything about not allowing n-particle entangled states, it would be inconsistent with the math of quantum mechanics. But it doesn’t, so it isn’t. (Note that some people have made their own interpretations that violate this, e.g. consciousness causes collapse. They were wrong.)