Which brings us back to an issue which I was debating here a couple of weeks ago: Is there a difference between an event being impossible, and an event being of measure zero?
Orthodox Bayesianism says there is no difference and strongly advises against thinking either to be the case. I’m wondering whether there isn’t some way to make the idea work that there is a distinction to be made—that some things are completely impossible given a theory, while other things are merely of infinitesimal probability.
It might be more accurate to say that surreal numbers are a subset of the numbers that were invented by Conway to describe the value of game positions.
Which brings us back to an issue which I was debating here a couple of weeks ago: Is there a difference between an event being impossible, and an event being of measure zero?
Orthodox Bayesianism says there is no difference and strongly advises against thinking either to be the case. I’m wondering whether there isn’t some way to make the idea work that there is a distinction to be made—that some things are completely impossible given a theory, while other things are merely of infinitesimal probability.
There’s a proposal to use surreal numbers for utilities. Such an approach was used for go by Conway.
It might be more accurate to say that surreal numbers are a subset of the numbers that were invented by Conway to describe the value of game positions.
Interesting suggestion. I ought to look into that. Thx.