either utilitarianism fails, in different ways, to consider this situation correctly
Utilitarianism that considers future utility does fine with it. So if for me utility=happiness I can still say that it would be better not to give the baby fetal alcohol syndrome because the happiness from drinking now would be much less than the later FAS-induced suffering.
Okay. The instrumentally rational way of referring to those people (who drink while pregnant and see nothing wrong with it) as ‘complete trash’. So that you don’t care a whole lot about them because the caring time is best spent helping those people in third world who don’t frigging oppose being helped or sabotage your effort to help their own children.
Utilitarianism that considers future utility does fine with it. So if for me utility=happiness I can still say that it would be better not to give the baby fetal alcohol syndrome because the happiness from drinking now would be much less than the later FAS-induced suffering.
Can you do abortions, though? What’s with just enough FAS so that the life of the sufferer still has positive utility? People with Down syndrome are generally very happy, what’s about inducing it?
The best thing about utilitarianism is that you can always find a version justifying what ever you want to do anyway, and can always find how this utility would be maximized by doing something that is grossly wrong, if you don’t like it any more.
People with Down syndrome are generally very happy, what’s about inducing it?
Don’t quite follow—you mean, ‘Would it be ethical to induce Down syndrome, given that people with Down syndrome are often very happy?’
Well, maybe. On the other hand, my impression is that as much as caregivers may want to deny it, a Down child imposes major costs on everyone around them. Inducing high IQ would not be obviously worse even in the cases where they flame out, would be a lot cheaper, and would pay for itself in inventions and that sort of thing. So there are lots of better alternatives to Down’s, and given a limited population, the optimal number of Down syndrome may be zero.
What’s with just enough FAS so that the life of the sufferer still has positive utility?
Aside from all this being hard to measure, you don’t usually care about absolute levels of utility so much as differences in predicted utility between choices. Say you’re choosing between:
a) Avoid drinking while pregnant: baby doesn’t get FAS, you don’t get to drink
b) Drink some during pregnancy: baby probably gets mild FAS, you don’t have to give up drinking
c) Drink lots during pregnancy: baby probably gets FAS, you get to keep drinking as much as you like
In saying “still has positive utility” you’re comparing (b) with a different choice “(d) have an abortion”. The right comparison is with (a) and (c): the things you were considering doing instead of (b). I suspect (a) has the highest utility because the benefit of drinking is probably much lower than the harm of FAS.
you can always find a version justifying what ever you want to do
Only if you change your moral system before each act.
drink while pregnant and see nothing wrong with it: complete trash
I brought up this hypothetical group as an illustration of the failure of a current-preferences utilitarianism.
In saying “still has positive utility” you’re comparing (b) with a different choice “(d) have an abortion”. The right comparison is with (a) and (c): the things you were considering doing instead of (b). I suspect (a) has the highest utility because the benefit of drinking is probably much lower than the harm of FAS.
then you can’t have abortion either, and not only that but you got to go and rally against abortions. While you’re at it, against contraceptives also.
The utilitarianism is unusable for determining actions. It is only usable for justifications. Got an action, pick an utilitarianism, pick a good sounding utility, and you have yourself a very noble goal towards which your decision works.
then you can’t have abortion either, and not only that but you got to go and rally against abortions. While you’re at it, against contraceptives also.
Let’s assume you’re a total hedonistic utilitarian: you want to maximize happiness over all people over all time. Naively, yes, abortions and contraception would decrease total all-time happiness because they decrease the number of future people. But prohibiting abortions and contraception also has negative effects on other people; lots of people get pregnant and really don’t want to have a baby. When abortion is illegal you have back-alley abortions which have a high chance of killing the woman. Even if we assume that the harm of requiring people to go through with unwanted pregnancies is minor and that no women will get abortions anyway, there’s still the question of whether an additional person will increase total happiness. It’s possible that the happiness of that particular extra person would be less than the distributed unhappiness caused by adding another person to a highly populated world.
Whether abortions or contraception prohibition is good public policy depends on its effects, which are not entirely known. They look negative to me, but I’m not that sure. We can increase our chances of making the right choice with more research, but I don’t see this as understood enough for pro-life or pro-choice advocacy
to be a good use of my time.
Got an action, pick an utilitarianism, pick a good sounding utility, and you have yourself a very noble goal towards which your decision works.
This isn’t how to use a moral system. Any moral system can be abused if you’re acting in bad faith.
huh?
Utilitarianism that considers future utility does fine with it. So if for me utility=happiness I can still say that it would be better not to give the baby fetal alcohol syndrome because the happiness from drinking now would be much less than the later FAS-induced suffering.
Okay. The instrumentally rational way of referring to those people (who drink while pregnant and see nothing wrong with it) as ‘complete trash’. So that you don’t care a whole lot about them because the caring time is best spent helping those people in third world who don’t frigging oppose being helped or sabotage your effort to help their own children.
Can you do abortions, though? What’s with just enough FAS so that the life of the sufferer still has positive utility? People with Down syndrome are generally very happy, what’s about inducing it?
The best thing about utilitarianism is that you can always find a version justifying what ever you want to do anyway, and can always find how this utility would be maximized by doing something that is grossly wrong, if you don’t like it any more.
Don’t quite follow—you mean, ‘Would it be ethical to induce Down syndrome, given that people with Down syndrome are often very happy?’
Well, maybe. On the other hand, my impression is that as much as caregivers may want to deny it, a Down child imposes major costs on everyone around them. Inducing high IQ would not be obviously worse even in the cases where they flame out, would be a lot cheaper, and would pay for itself in inventions and that sort of thing. So there are lots of better alternatives to Down’s, and given a limited population, the optimal number of Down syndrome may be zero.
Aside from all this being hard to measure, you don’t usually care about absolute levels of utility so much as differences in predicted utility between choices. Say you’re choosing between:
a) Avoid drinking while pregnant: baby doesn’t get FAS, you don’t get to drink
b) Drink some during pregnancy: baby probably gets mild FAS, you don’t have to give up drinking
c) Drink lots during pregnancy: baby probably gets FAS, you get to keep drinking as much as you like
In saying “still has positive utility” you’re comparing (b) with a different choice “(d) have an abortion”. The right comparison is with (a) and (c): the things you were considering doing instead of (b). I suspect (a) has the highest utility because the benefit of drinking is probably much lower than the harm of FAS.
Only if you change your moral system before each act.
I brought up this hypothetical group as an illustration of the failure of a current-preferences utilitarianism.
then you can’t have abortion either, and not only that but you got to go and rally against abortions. While you’re at it, against contraceptives also.
The utilitarianism is unusable for determining actions. It is only usable for justifications. Got an action, pick an utilitarianism, pick a good sounding utility, and you have yourself a very noble goal towards which your decision works.
Let’s assume you’re a total hedonistic utilitarian: you want to maximize happiness over all people over all time. Naively, yes, abortions and contraception would decrease total all-time happiness because they decrease the number of future people. But prohibiting abortions and contraception also has negative effects on other people; lots of people get pregnant and really don’t want to have a baby. When abortion is illegal you have back-alley abortions which have a high chance of killing the woman. Even if we assume that the harm of requiring people to go through with unwanted pregnancies is minor and that no women will get abortions anyway, there’s still the question of whether an additional person will increase total happiness. It’s possible that the happiness of that particular extra person would be less than the distributed unhappiness caused by adding another person to a highly populated world.
Whether abortions or contraception prohibition is good public policy depends on its effects, which are not entirely known. They look negative to me, but I’m not that sure. We can increase our chances of making the right choice with more research, but I don’t see this as understood enough for pro-life or pro-choice advocacy to be a good use of my time.
This isn’t how to use a moral system. Any moral system can be abused if you’re acting in bad faith.
re: the unknown effects, yes, what ever you want to do you can always argue for in utilitarianism, because partial sums.
Some moral systems are impossible to use for anything but rationalization. Utilitarianism is a perfect example of such.