I think it’s all evidence, and the delusion is part of the materialist explanation of that evidence. Analogously, part of the atheist hypothesis has to be an explanation of why so many cultures developed religions.
That said, as we discussed, there’s debate over what the nature of the evidence is and whether delusions in the materialist brains of us zombies can adequately explain it.
And “fossils were created by the Devil to mislead us” is part of the theist explanation of creationism. The thing is, that rationalists have complete contempt for this kind of argument in some contexts...but rationalists also believe that rationality is based on normative rules. If “don’t dismiss evidence as delusory” is a rule, it has to apply to everybody. And it it isn’t, it has to apply to nobody.
I wouldn’t support a “don’t dismiss evidence as delusory” rule. Indeed, there are some obvious delusions in the world, as well as optical illusions and such. I think the reason to have more credence in materialism than theist creationism is the relative prior probabilities of the two hypotheses: materialism is a lot simpler and seems less ad hoc. (That said, materialism can organically suggest some creationism-like scenarios, such as the simulation hypothesis.)
Ultimately the choice of what hypothesis seems simpler and less ad hoc is up to an individual to decide, as a “matter of faith”. There’s no getting around the need to start with bedrock assumptions.
A major problem with physicalist dismissal of experiential evidence (as I’ve discussed previously) is that the conventional case for believing in physics is that it explains experiential evidence, e.g. experimental results. Solomonoff induction, among the best formalizations of Occam’s razor, believes in “my observations”.
If basic facts like “I have observations” are being doubted, then any case for belief in physics has to go through something independent of its explanations of experiential evidence. This looks to be a difficult problem.
You could potentially resolve the problem by saying that only some observations, such as those of mechanical measuring devices, count; however, this still leads to an analogous problem to the hard problem of consciousness, namely, what is the mapping between physics and the outputs of the mechanical measuring devices that are being explained by theories? (The same problem comes up of “what data is the theorizing trying to explain” whether the theorizing happens in a single brain or in a distributed intelligence, e.g. a collection of people using the scientific method)
If basic facts like “I have observations” are being doubted, then any case for belief in physics has to go through something independent of its explanations of experiential evidence. This looks to be a difficult problem
There are significant differences between observations in the sense of pointer positions, and qualia.
You could potentially resolve the problem by saying that only some observations, such as those of mechanical measuring devices, count; however, this still leads to an analogous problem to the hard problem of consciousness, namely, what is the mapping between physics and the outputs of the mechanical measuring devices that are being explained by theories?
OK, but then you have parted company with the strong program in rationalism, the idea that all rational agents should be able to converge on objective truth.
I have “faith” in things like Occam’s razor and hope it helps get toward objective truth, but there’s no way to know for sure. Without constraints on the prior, we can’t say much of anything beyond the data we have.
choosing an appropriate algorithm requires making assumptions about the kinds of target functions the algorithm is being used for. With no assumptions, no “meta-algorithm”, such as the scientific method, performs better than random choice.
For example, without an assumption that nature is regular, a million observations of the sun having risen on past days would tell us nothing about whether it will rise again tomorrow.
My comment about Occam’s razor was in reply to “the idea that all rational agents should be able to converge on objective truth.” I was pointing out that even if you agree on the data, you still may not agree on the conclusions if you have different priors. But yes, you’re right that you may not agree on how to characterize the data either.
So evidence contrary to materialism isn’t evidence, it’s a delusion.
I think it’s all evidence, and the delusion is part of the materialist explanation of that evidence. Analogously, part of the atheist hypothesis has to be an explanation of why so many cultures developed religions.
That said, as we discussed, there’s debate over what the nature of the evidence is and whether delusions in the materialist brains of us zombies can adequately explain it.
And “fossils were created by the Devil to mislead us” is part of the theist explanation of creationism. The thing is, that rationalists have complete contempt for this kind of argument in some contexts...but rationalists also believe that rationality is based on normative rules. If “don’t dismiss evidence as delusory” is a rule, it has to apply to everybody. And it it isn’t, it has to apply to nobody.
I wouldn’t support a “don’t dismiss evidence as delusory” rule. Indeed, there are some obvious delusions in the world, as well as optical illusions and such. I think the reason to have more credence in materialism than theist creationism is the relative prior probabilities of the two hypotheses: materialism is a lot simpler and seems less ad hoc. (That said, materialism can organically suggest some creationism-like scenarios, such as the simulation hypothesis.)
Ultimately the choice of what hypothesis seems simpler and less ad hoc is up to an individual to decide, as a “matter of faith”. There’s no getting around the need to start with bedrock assumptions.
A major problem with physicalist dismissal of experiential evidence (as I’ve discussed previously) is that the conventional case for believing in physics is that it explains experiential evidence, e.g. experimental results. Solomonoff induction, among the best formalizations of Occam’s razor, believes in “my observations”.
If basic facts like “I have observations” are being doubted, then any case for belief in physics has to go through something independent of its explanations of experiential evidence. This looks to be a difficult problem.
You could potentially resolve the problem by saying that only some observations, such as those of mechanical measuring devices, count; however, this still leads to an analogous problem to the hard problem of consciousness, namely, what is the mapping between physics and the outputs of the mechanical measuring devices that are being explained by theories? (The same problem comes up of “what data is the theorizing trying to explain” whether the theorizing happens in a single brain or in a distributed intelligence, e.g. a collection of people using the scientific method)
There are significant differences between observations in the sense of pointer positions, and qualia.
That’s much more like the easy problem.
OK, but then you have parted company with the strong program in rationalism, the idea that all rational agents should be able to converge on objective truth.
I have “faith” in things like Occam’s razor and hope it helps get toward objective truth, but there’s no way to know for sure. Without constraints on the prior, we can’t say much of anything beyond the data we have.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_free_lunch_theorem#Implications_for_computing_and_for_the_scientific_method
For example, without an assumption that nature is regular, a million observations of the sun having risen on past days would tell us nothing about whether it will rise again tomorrow.
Occam’s razor tells you to find the simplest explanation for the evidence,so it is downstream of the question of what constitutes evidence.
My comment about Occam’s razor was in reply to “the idea that all rational agents should be able to converge on objective truth.” I was pointing out that even if you agree on the data, you still may not agree on the conclusions if you have different priors. But yes, you’re right that you may not agree on how to characterize the data either.