So if Universe A features epiphenomenal consciousness, and Universe B doesn’t, and that we consider the statement that we are in universe A and not universe B, then looking back at the rule:
“For a statement to be comparable to your universe, so that it can be true or alternatively false, it must talk about stuff you can find in relation to yourself by tracing out causal links.”
These “causal links” you trace out are part of the map, not part of the territory—you have to be able to deduce their existence. And in this case (unlike the spaceship scenario), there is no way anybody can deduce the existence of the neuron → consciousness link, since by definition nothing can be observed about the consciousness.
So if Universe A features epiphenomenal consciousness, and Universe B doesn’t, and that we consider the statement that we are in universe A and not universe B, then looking back at the rule:
These “causal links” you trace out are part of the map, not part of the territory—you have to be able to deduce their existence. And in this case (unlike the spaceship scenario), there is no way anybody can deduce the existence of the neuron → consciousness link, since by definition nothing can be observed about the consciousness.
=> so, firmly in the “meaningless” camp.