Does the idea that everything is made of causes and effects meaningfully constrain experience?
No. For any set of observations O1, O2, …, O_N, you can construct an overprecise causal model that links some central cause to nodes O1, O2, …, O_N. [That is, our causal model is: “You observed O1 because God willed it. Then you observed O2 because God willed it...”] Thus causal models can explain any set of observations. Constraining experience requires in addition some sort of Occam’s Razor that prefers simpler causal models.
Constraining experience requires in addition some sort of Occam’s Razor that prefers simpler causal models.
I’d agree with the assertion “Unknowable relationships are equivalent to no relationship”. In other words, cause-and-effect is only meaningful if we have some ability to gather information as to the nature of the relationships. Occam’s Razor is one such method, but I wouldn’t assume that it’s specifically required—we could just as easily be born with divine insight as to the cause-effect relationships.
No. For any set of observations O1, O2, …, O_N, you can construct an overprecise causal model that links some central cause to nodes O1, O2, …, O_N. [That is, our causal model is: “You observed O1 because God willed it. Then you observed O2 because God willed it...”] Thus causal models can explain any set of observations. Constraining experience requires in addition some sort of Occam’s Razor that prefers simpler causal models.
I’d agree with the assertion “Unknowable relationships are equivalent to no relationship”. In other words, cause-and-effect is only meaningful if we have some ability to gather information as to the nature of the relationships. Occam’s Razor is one such method, but I wouldn’t assume that it’s specifically required—we could just as easily be born with divine insight as to the cause-effect relationships.