This about as accurate a caricature as describing someone’s position as “every one of my beliefs is true”
“such as” means that what follows is an example, not an exhaustive list, and what I said doesn’t apply just to that example and to nothing else. If rationality means deriving conclusions logically from premises, then I concede that opposition to gay marriage can be rational, given appropriate premises.
Why are you so convinced that is in fact a true belief since you don’t seem able to produce any argument for it?
It’s pointless to produce an argument for it. The chance that even with a valid argument I could persuade someone who opposes gay marriage, to support gay marriage, is negligible.
An argument is valid if, given true premises, it always and exclusively produces true conclusions. A valid argument in this context might therefore be “given that we wish to maximise social welfare (A) and that allowing gay marriage increases social welfare (B), we should allow gay marriage (C)”. A and B really do imply C. Some people contend that the argument is not sound (that is, that its conclusion is false) because at least one of its premises is not true (reflecting reality); I am not aware of anyone who contends that it is invalid.
Jiro is contending that people who oppose gay marriage do not do so because they have valid arguments for doing so; if we were to refute their arguments they would not change their minds. Xe has argued above that people (as a group) did not stop being anti-homosexuality for rational reasons, i.e. because the state of the evidence changed in important ways or because new valid arguments were brought to bear, but rather for irrational reasons, such as old people dying.
The fact that Jiro considers it rational to believe that gay marriage is a good thing, and thus that people’s beliefs are now in better accord with an ideal reasoner’s beliefs (“are more rational”), does not contradict Jiro’s belief that popular opinion changed for reasons other than those that would affect a Bayesian. Eugine_Nier appears to be conflating two senses of “rational”.
As RichardKennaway observes, we ought to ask why Jiro believes that we should allow gay marriage. I suspect the answer will be close to “because it increases social welfare”, which seems to be a well-founded claim.
To a first approxmotion: the fact that there’s uptake for it means people judge it to increase their welfare.
Which also applies to things like smoking and starting a war with your neighbours. Are you really arguing that everything people do in noticeable numbers increases social welfare?
You’re making the argument “people doing X is evidence for X increasing social welfare”. I don’t think this argument works, first approximation or not.
“such as” means that what follows is an example, not an exhaustive list, and what I said doesn’t apply just to that example and to nothing else. If rationality means deriving conclusions logically from premises, then I concede that opposition to gay marriage can be rational, given appropriate premises.
It’s pointless to produce an argument for it. The chance that even with a valid argument I could persuade someone who opposes gay marriage, to support gay marriage, is negligible.
The question is not, how would you persuade someone else, but, what persuades you?
What would constitute a valid argument in this context?
An argument is valid if, given true premises, it always and exclusively produces true conclusions. A valid argument in this context might therefore be “given that we wish to maximise social welfare (A) and that allowing gay marriage increases social welfare (B), we should allow gay marriage (C)”. A and B really do imply C. Some people contend that the argument is not sound (that is, that its conclusion is false) because at least one of its premises is not true (reflecting reality); I am not aware of anyone who contends that it is invalid.
Jiro is contending that people who oppose gay marriage do not do so because they have valid arguments for doing so; if we were to refute their arguments they would not change their minds. Xe has argued above that people (as a group) did not stop being anti-homosexuality for rational reasons, i.e. because the state of the evidence changed in important ways or because new valid arguments were brought to bear, but rather for irrational reasons, such as old people dying.
The fact that Jiro considers it rational to believe that gay marriage is a good thing, and thus that people’s beliefs are now in better accord with an ideal reasoner’s beliefs (“are more rational”), does not contradict Jiro’s belief that popular opinion changed for reasons other than those that would affect a Bayesian. Eugine_Nier appears to be conflating two senses of “rational”.
As RichardKennaway observes, we ought to ask why Jiro believes that we should allow gay marriage. I suspect the answer will be close to “because it increases social welfare”, which seems to be a well-founded claim.
Ok, now what’s the evidence that this is in fact the case?
To a first approxmotion: the fact that there’s uptake for it means people judge it to increase their welfare.
Since that is obvious, I suppose you mean there are negative externalities that lead to ne.tt negative welfare. In which case: what is YOUR evidence?
Which also applies to things like smoking and starting a war with your neighbours. Are you really arguing that everything people do in noticeable numbers increases social welfare?
“To a first approximation.”
We know the negative externalities of the examples you mention.
You’re making the argument “people doing X is evidence for X increasing social welfare”. I don’t think this argument works, first approximation or not.
We’re discussing social and cultural memes, not formal logic.
Do note that “I oppose gay marriage because it goes against God’s law” is a valid argument.