The Smoking Lesion and Newcomb are formally equivalent. So no consistent decision theory can say, “smoke, but one-box.” Eliezer hoped to get this response. If he succeeded, UDT is inconsistent. If UDT is consistent, it must recommend either smoking and two-boxing, or not smoking and one-boxing.
Notice that cousin it’s argument applies exactly to the 100% correlation smoking lesion: you can deduce from the fact that you do not smoke that you do not have cancer, and by UDT as cousin it understands it, that is all you need to decide not to smoke.
My way of looking at this:
The Smoking Lesion and Newcomb are formally equivalent. So no consistent decision theory can say, “smoke, but one-box.” Eliezer hoped to get this response. If he succeeded, UDT is inconsistent. If UDT is consistent, it must recommend either smoking and two-boxing, or not smoking and one-boxing.
Notice that cousin it’s argument applies exactly to the 100% correlation smoking lesion: you can deduce from the fact that you do not smoke that you do not have cancer, and by UDT as cousin it understands it, that is all you need to decide not to smoke.