I find that the Smoker’s Lesion problem and this new version of it have the same flaw: you’re assuming that it is possible for someone to make an optimal choice, but you’re also postulating that there’s an outside force which affects what the person chooses. These assumptions aren’t consistent.
In problems like this, the inconsistency is normally hidden by postulating that the smoking lesion/cosmological truth only has a slight influence on your choice rather than a 100% correlation with it. This makes it harder to intuitively see the inconsistency, but doesn’t get rid of it.
I find that the Smoker’s Lesion problem and this new version of it have the same flaw: you’re assuming that it is possible for someone to make an optimal choice, but you’re also postulating that there’s an outside force which affects what the person chooses. These assumptions aren’t consistent.
In problems like this, the inconsistency is normally hidden by postulating that the smoking lesion/cosmological truth only has a slight influence on your choice rather than a 100% correlation with it. This makes it harder to intuitively see the inconsistency, but doesn’t get rid of it.