The advice this post points to is probably useful for some people, but I think LessWrongers are the last people who need to be told to be less socially graceful in favor of more epistemic virtue.
I would certainly have thought this, but recent experience has shown the diametric opposite to be true. The OP’s advice is sorely needed here more than almost anywhere else.
In particular, it is not just that LessWrongers need to be told to be less socially graceful, but—and especially—that they need to be told to demand less “social grace” (if what’s demanded even deserves such a respectful term) from others.
So much basic kindness is already lacking in the way that many rationalists interact, and it’s often deeply painful to be around.
I agree with this. But it’s precisely the “basic kindness” which doesn’t interfere with “epistemic virtues” that rationalists are unusually bad at; and, conversely, precisely the “basic kindness” (though, again, I consider this to be a tendentious description in that case) which does interfere with “epistemic virtues” that’s mostly commonly demanded. This leaves us with the worst of both worlds.
Also, I just don’t really buy that there’s a necessary, direct tradeoff between epistemic virtue and social grace. I am quite blunt, honest, and (I believe) epistemically virtuous, but I still generally interact in a way that endears me to people and makes them feel listened to and not attacked. (If you know me feel free to comment/agree/disagree on this statement.) I’m not saying that all of my interactions are 100% successful in this regard but I think I come across as basically kind and socially graceful without sacrificing honesty or epistemics.
I do not know you personally, so I certainly can’t dispute nor affirm this claim. But it does seem to me to be an entirely plausible claim…
… if, and only if, we construe “social grace” in such a way that rules out its interference with epistemics (cf. this comment).
Now, I think that this is a reasonable use of the term “social grace” (and for this reason I think that Zack has made a somewhat unfortunate word choice in the post’s title). The trouble is, such a construal makes your claim a question-begging one.
And if what you mean is that, for example, in a scenario like the Feyman story in the OP, you would nevertheless attend to social status, behave with deference, couch your disagreements in qualifications, avoid outright saying to people’s faces that they’re wrong or that their idea is bad, etc., etc., well… then I think that your claim that such “social grace” doesn’t interfere with “epistemic virtue” is just flat-out false.
I would certainly have thought this, but recent experience has shown the diametric opposite to be true. The OP’s advice is sorely needed here more than almost anywhere else.
In particular, it is not just that LessWrongers need to be told to be less socially graceful, but—and especially—that they need to be told to demand less “social grace” (if what’s demanded even deserves such a respectful term) from others.
I agree with this. But it’s precisely the “basic kindness” which doesn’t interfere with “epistemic virtues” that rationalists are unusually bad at; and, conversely, precisely the “basic kindness” (though, again, I consider this to be a tendentious description in that case) which does interfere with “epistemic virtues” that’s mostly commonly demanded. This leaves us with the worst of both worlds.
I do not know you personally, so I certainly can’t dispute nor affirm this claim. But it does seem to me to be an entirely plausible claim…
… if, and only if, we construe “social grace” in such a way that rules out its interference with epistemics (cf. this comment).
Now, I think that this is a reasonable use of the term “social grace” (and for this reason I think that Zack has made a somewhat unfortunate word choice in the post’s title). The trouble is, such a construal makes your claim a question-begging one.
And if what you mean is that, for example, in a scenario like the Feyman story in the OP, you would nevertheless attend to social status, behave with deference, couch your disagreements in qualifications, avoid outright saying to people’s faces that they’re wrong or that their idea is bad, etc., etc., well… then I think that your claim that such “social grace” doesn’t interfere with “epistemic virtue” is just flat-out false.