The mobilisation in Russia is seemingly an expensive bet. In the short term, he annoys draftees/prospective draftees, deprives the Russian economy of their labour and loses a bunch of working age men from the country. In the medium run, I think having relatives involved is more likely to push ambivalent families to an anti war position than the reverse.
So if it’s a costly bet, then what is it a costly bet on? Seemingly, it is not a bet on the prospect of using nuclear weapons to force Ukraine to negotiate on favourable terms with shock and awe—it’s possible that they assess that such a threat would be more effective if backed by a more threatening fighting force, but it doesn’t seem to me that mobilisation plays a critical role in this (compared to, say, demonstrating the resolve to employ nuclear weapons and continue doing so until the issue is settled).
Mobilisation might be a bet on a nuclear show of force failing, but it seems odd to me that they’d plan to break the nuclear taboo while assessing there’s a decent chance it fails and relying on forces raised by mobilisation if it does. This seems like a really bad plan to me, though—if a nuclear show of force fails, it’s not like the mobilisation is obviously going to work. Thus Putin would be in the position of a) maybe still losing the war, b) breaking the nuclear taboo and c) putting a decent number of Russian citizens offside. Which is to say: a nuclear show of force only seems like it’s a good idea if it has a high chance of working, and if it does then why mobilise?
Overall, mobilisation seems like evidence against the possibility of a show of force.
Finally, maybe Russia plans/decides to use nuclear weapons to support conventional army operations. It maybe makes sense that they need to maintain the conventional army to pursue this strategy (I have to admit: I know little about how battlefield nuclear weapons change the need for manpower). Under this hypothesis, Russia is at least not anticipating a strategic nuclear exchange, though they could be misguided about the consequences. Conversely, I think the higher the likelihood that Russia assigns to escalation to a strategic exchange (or simply drawing additional adversaries into the fight), the lower the chance that this possibility eventuates. The higher chance of escalation in this case suggests to me that this possibility should be lower on priors than the “show of force” option.
Finally, the mobilisation makes a lot of sense of Russian command basically expects to keep doing more of the same.
Overall, I think the mobilisation indicates that Russian strategic command still thinks nuclear escalation is unlikely. As evidence, it is maybe equivocal between “more of the same” vs “battlefield nukes”, but reduces the likelihood of “show of force/shock and awe”.
I’m not sure about this but have seen a few reports that most of the conscripts are coming from minority groups within the Russian Federation so this might be as much about mitigating internal dissent as it is about actually fighting/winning in Ukraine.
The mobilisation in Russia is seemingly an expensive bet. In the short term, he annoys draftees/prospective draftees, deprives the Russian economy of their labour and loses a bunch of working age men from the country. In the medium run, I think having relatives involved is more likely to push ambivalent families to an anti war position than the reverse.
So if it’s a costly bet, then what is it a costly bet on? Seemingly, it is not a bet on the prospect of using nuclear weapons to force Ukraine to negotiate on favourable terms with shock and awe—it’s possible that they assess that such a threat would be more effective if backed by a more threatening fighting force, but it doesn’t seem to me that mobilisation plays a critical role in this (compared to, say, demonstrating the resolve to employ nuclear weapons and continue doing so until the issue is settled).
Mobilisation might be a bet on a nuclear show of force failing, but it seems odd to me that they’d plan to break the nuclear taboo while assessing there’s a decent chance it fails and relying on forces raised by mobilisation if it does. This seems like a really bad plan to me, though—if a nuclear show of force fails, it’s not like the mobilisation is obviously going to work. Thus Putin would be in the position of a) maybe still losing the war, b) breaking the nuclear taboo and c) putting a decent number of Russian citizens offside. Which is to say: a nuclear show of force only seems like it’s a good idea if it has a high chance of working, and if it does then why mobilise?
Overall, mobilisation seems like evidence against the possibility of a show of force.
Finally, maybe Russia plans/decides to use nuclear weapons to support conventional army operations. It maybe makes sense that they need to maintain the conventional army to pursue this strategy (I have to admit: I know little about how battlefield nuclear weapons change the need for manpower). Under this hypothesis, Russia is at least not anticipating a strategic nuclear exchange, though they could be misguided about the consequences. Conversely, I think the higher the likelihood that Russia assigns to escalation to a strategic exchange (or simply drawing additional adversaries into the fight), the lower the chance that this possibility eventuates. The higher chance of escalation in this case suggests to me that this possibility should be lower on priors than the “show of force” option.
Finally, the mobilisation makes a lot of sense of Russian command basically expects to keep doing more of the same.
Overall, I think the mobilisation indicates that Russian strategic command still thinks nuclear escalation is unlikely. As evidence, it is maybe equivocal between “more of the same” vs “battlefield nukes”, but reduces the likelihood of “show of force/shock and awe”.
I’m not sure about this but have seen a few reports that most of the conscripts are coming from minority groups within the Russian Federation so this might be as much about mitigating internal dissent as it is about actually fighting/winning in Ukraine.