Even if other people within the Russian elite don’t have direct knowledge, they have a much better model of Putin than we do.
Imagine the conversation between two people in the Russian elite:
Alice: What do you think, did Putin blow up the pipeline?
Bob: I don’t know for certain, but with him, you never know...
Alice: Yes, the other day he did XYZ which was really crazy...
Bob: What motivation do you think he could have?
Alice: I think he’s afraid of a coup because of YZX.
Bob: It’s right for him to fear that because of ZYX.
Neither Alice nor Bob committed treason by saying anything they said but they managed to build shared knowledge that makes it easier to agree to do a coup together.
The point is that the faction can credibly promise everyone more resources/etc. than Putin can, rather than just a different distribution of resources (“don’t worry, you’ll be one of the monkeys on the winning team, I promise”)
Getting rid of Putin likely involves more than just getting rid of Putin, a lot of other people that are currently in power will lose their power as well. People who currently have power by virtue of having shown loyalty to Putin over decades have a good chance to lose that power even if more resources are available.
Making a deal to get rid of the Western sanctions and stop the costly war already allows credibly promising that there are more resources to be distributed.
It’s always good to be on the inside of a coup, yes, but why give potential enemies a natural incentive to dispose of you, if you’re not going to turn back on the oil any time soon?
The pipeline provides leverage for negotiations with Germany. It also allows for more room to navigate in case, Russia needs the money to buy the loyalty of whoever is hurt by the war. With money, it’s easy to pay unemployed workers at car factories their salaries. Having that option available is useful for scenarios where he actually needs the money.
Otherwise why hasn’t a spy given the game up yet?
Intelligence agencies generally are not in the habit of wanting to give information to the public. I don’t think you can deduce much from secret services not sharing information with the public.
Even if other people within the Russian elite don’t have direct knowledge, they have a much better model of Putin than we do.
Imagine the conversation between two people in the Russian elite:
Alice: What do you think, did Putin blow up the pipeline?
Bob: I don’t know for certain, but with him, you never know...
Alice: Yes, the other day he did XYZ which was really crazy...
Bob: What motivation do you think he could have?
Alice: I think he’s afraid of a coup because of YZX.
Bob: It’s right for him to fear that because of ZYX.
Neither Alice nor Bob committed treason by saying anything they said but they managed to build shared knowledge that makes it easier to agree to do a coup together.
Getting rid of Putin likely involves more than just getting rid of Putin, a lot of other people that are currently in power will lose their power as well. People who currently have power by virtue of having shown loyalty to Putin over decades have a good chance to lose that power even if more resources are available.
Making a deal to get rid of the Western sanctions and stop the costly war already allows credibly promising that there are more resources to be distributed.
The pipeline provides leverage for negotiations with Germany. It also allows for more room to navigate in case, Russia needs the money to buy the loyalty of whoever is hurt by the war. With money, it’s easy to pay unemployed workers at car factories their salaries. Having that option available is useful for scenarios where he actually needs the money.
Intelligence agencies generally are not in the habit of wanting to give information to the public. I don’t think you can deduce much from secret services not sharing information with the public.