I’ve noticed another reason a person might need a binding theory, if they were the sort of agent who takes Rawlsian Veils to their greatest extent, the one who imagines that we are all the same eternal actor playing out every part in a single play, who follows a sort of timeless, placeless cooperative game theory that obligates them to follow a preference utilitarianism extending — not just over the other stakeholders in some coalition, as a transparent pragmatist might — but over every observer that exists.
They’d need a good way of counting and weighting observers, to reflect the extent to which their experiences are being had. That would be their weighting.
I’ve noticed another reason a person might need a binding theory, if they were the sort of agent who takes Rawlsian Veils to their greatest extent, the one who imagines that we are all the same eternal actor playing out every part in a single play, who follows a sort of timeless, placeless cooperative game theory that obligates them to follow a preference utilitarianism extending — not just over the other stakeholders in some coalition, as a transparent pragmatist might — but over every observer that exists.
They’d need a good way of counting and weighting observers, to reflect the extent to which their experiences are being had. That would be their weighting.