What Scott defends in that post isn’t the notion of a completely consistent belief net. In Moat-and-Bailey fashion Scott defends claims that are less strong.
From Chapman model of the world Scott defends Bayesianism as a level 4 framework against other frameworks that are also level 4 or lower (in the Kegan framework). A person who’s at the developmental stage of level 3 can’t simply go to level 5 but profits from learning a framework like Bayesianism that gives certain clear answers. From that perspective, the person likely needs a few years in that stage to be able to later grow out of it.
You then terminate all three into a final P(rain|all-available-knowledge), where you weight the influence of each of the three submodels according to your prior confidence in that model.
Right. You don’t use your brains pattern matching ability to pick the right model but you use a quite simple probabilistic one. I think that’s likely a mistake. But I don’t know whether I can explain to you why I think so in a way that would convince you. That’s why I didn’t continue the other discussion.
Additionally, even when I think you are wrong that doesn’t mean that nothing productive can come out of the belief net experiment.
What can a “level 5 framework” do, operationally, that is different than what can be done with a Bayes net?
Do well at problems that require developing ontology to represent the problem like Bongard’s problems (see Chapman’s post on metarationality)
I admit that I don’t understand what you’re actually trying to argue, Christian.
Yes, fully understanding would likely mean that you need to spend time understanding a new conceptional framework. It’s not as easy as simply picking up another mental trick.
But in this thread, my point isn’t to argue that everybody should adopt meta-rationality but to illustrate that it’s actually a different way of looking at the world.
What Scott defends in that post isn’t the notion of a completely consistent belief net. In Moat-and-Bailey fashion Scott defends claims that are less strong.
Chapman also wrote the more mathy followup post: https://meaningness.com/probability-and-logic
From Chapman model of the world Scott defends Bayesianism as a level 4 framework against other frameworks that are also level 4 or lower (in the Kegan framework). A person who’s at the developmental stage of level 3 can’t simply go to level 5 but profits from learning a framework like Bayesianism that gives certain clear answers. From that perspective, the person likely needs a few years in that stage to be able to later grow out of it.
Right. You don’t use your brains pattern matching ability to pick the right model but you use a quite simple probabilistic one. I think that’s likely a mistake. But I don’t know whether I can explain to you why I think so in a way that would convince you. That’s why I didn’t continue the other discussion.
Additionally, even when I think you are wrong that doesn’t mean that nothing productive can come out of the belief net experiment.
What can a “level 5 framework” do, operationally, that is different than what can be done with a Bayes net?
I admit that I don’t understand what you’re actually trying to argue, Christian.
Do well at problems that require developing ontology to represent the problem like Bongard’s problems (see Chapman’s post on metarationality)
Yes, fully understanding would likely mean that you need to spend time understanding a new conceptional framework. It’s not as easy as simply picking up another mental trick.
But in this thread, my point isn’t to argue that everybody should adopt meta-rationality but to illustrate that it’s actually a different way of looking at the world.