Rule consequentialism is what a call a multi-threaded moral theory—a blend of deontology and consequentialism if you will. I advocate multi-threaded theories. The idea that there is a correct single-threaded theory of morality seems implausible. Moral rules to me are a subset of modal rules for survival-focused agents.
To work out if something is right run a bunch of ‘algorithms’ (in parallel threads if you like) not just one. (No commitment made to Turing computability of said ‘algorithms’ though...)
So...
#assume virtue ethics
If I do X what virtues does this display/exhibit?
#assume categorical imperative
If everyone does X how would I value the world then?
#assume principle of utility
Will X increase the greatest happiness for the greatest number?
#assume golden rule
If X were done to me instead of my doing X would I accept this?
#emotions
If I do X will this trigger any emotional reaction (disgust, guilt, shame, embarrassment, joy, ecstasy, triumph etc)
#laws
Is there is law or sanction if I do X?
#precedent
Have I done X before, how did that go?
#relationships
If I do X what impact will that have on relationships I have?
#motives goal
Do I want to do X?
#interest welfare prudence
Is X in my interest? Safe? Dangerous etc
#value
Does X have value? To me, to others etc
Sometimes one or two reasons will provide a slam dunk decision. It’s illegal and I don’t want to do it anyway. Othertimes, the call is harder.
Personally, I find a range of considerations more persuasive than one. I am personally inclined to sentimentalism at the meta-ethical tier and particularism at the normative and applied ethical tiers.
Of course, strictly speaking particularism implies that normative ethical theories are false over-generalizations and that a theory of reasons rests on a theory of values. Values are fundamentally emotive. No amount of post hoc moral rationalization will change that.
Rule consequentialism is what a call a multi-threaded moral theory—a blend of deontology and consequentialism if you will. I advocate multi-threaded theories. The idea that there is a correct single-threaded theory of morality seems implausible. Moral rules to me are a subset of modal rules for survival-focused agents.
To work out if something is right run a bunch of ‘algorithms’ (in parallel threads if you like) not just one. (No commitment made to Turing computability of said ‘algorithms’ though...)
So...
#assume virtue ethics
If I do X what virtues does this display/exhibit?
#assume categorical imperative
If everyone does X how would I value the world then?
#assume principle of utility
Will X increase the greatest happiness for the greatest number?
#assume golden rule
If X were done to me instead of my doing X would I accept this?
#emotions
If I do X will this trigger any emotional reaction (disgust, guilt, shame, embarrassment, joy, ecstasy, triumph etc)
#laws
Is there is law or sanction if I do X?
#precedent
Have I done X before, how did that go?
#relationships
If I do X what impact will that have on relationships I have?
#motives goal
Do I want to do X?
#interest welfare prudence
Is X in my interest? Safe? Dangerous etc
#value
Does X have value? To me, to others etc
Sometimes one or two reasons will provide a slam dunk decision. It’s illegal and I don’t want to do it anyway. Othertimes, the call is harder.
Personally, I find a range of considerations more persuasive than one. I am personally inclined to sentimentalism at the meta-ethical tier and particularism at the normative and applied ethical tiers.
Of course, strictly speaking particularism implies that normative ethical theories are false over-generalizations and that a theory of reasons rests on a theory of values. Values are fundamentally emotive. No amount of post hoc moral rationalization will change that.