I’m using ‘anthropocentric’ instead to mean ‘only human experiences matter’.
Ah, okay, to be clear, I’m not defending this view. I think it’s a strawman.
I don’t think which reasons happen to psychologically motivate us matters here.
I didn’t refer to psychological reasons. An example besides Kant’s (which is not psychological in the relevant sense) might be this: it is unethical to torture a cow because though cows have no ethical significance in and of themselves, they do have ethical significance as domesticated animals, who are wards of our society. But that’s just an example of such a reason.
No, the latter was an afterthought. The discussion begins here.
I took the discussion to begin from Peter’s response to that comment, since that comment didn’t contain an argument, while Peter’s did. It would be weird for me to respond to Qiaochu’s request for an argument defending the moral significance of animal suffering by defending the idea that only human suffering is fundamental.
But this is getting to be a discussion about our discussion. I’m not tapping out, quite, but I would like us to move on to the actual conversation.
It would be weird for me to respond to Qiaochu’s request for an argument defending the moral significance of animal suffering by defending the idea that only human suffering is fundamental.
Not if you agreed with Qiaochu that no adequately strong reasons for caring about any non-human suffering have yet been presented. There’s no rule against agreeing with an OP.
Fair point, though we might be reading Qiaochu differently. I took him to be saying “I know of no reasons to take animal suffering as morally significant, though this is consistant with my treating it as if it is and with its actually being so.” I suppose you took him to be saying something more like “I don’t think there are any reasons to take animal suffering as morally significant.”
I don’t have good reasons to think my reading is better. I wouldn’t want to try and defend Qiaochu’s view if the second reading represents it.
Ah, okay, to be clear, I’m not defending this view. I think it’s a strawman.
I didn’t refer to psychological reasons. An example besides Kant’s (which is not psychological in the relevant sense) might be this: it is unethical to torture a cow because though cows have no ethical significance in and of themselves, they do have ethical significance as domesticated animals, who are wards of our society. But that’s just an example of such a reason.
I took the discussion to begin from Peter’s response to that comment, since that comment didn’t contain an argument, while Peter’s did. It would be weird for me to respond to Qiaochu’s request for an argument defending the moral significance of animal suffering by defending the idea that only human suffering is fundamental.
But this is getting to be a discussion about our discussion. I’m not tapping out, quite, but I would like us to move on to the actual conversation.
Not if you agreed with Qiaochu that no adequately strong reasons for caring about any non-human suffering have yet been presented. There’s no rule against agreeing with an OP.
Fair point, though we might be reading Qiaochu differently. I took him to be saying “I know of no reasons to take animal suffering as morally significant, though this is consistant with my treating it as if it is and with its actually being so.” I suppose you took him to be saying something more like “I don’t think there are any reasons to take animal suffering as morally significant.”
I don’t have good reasons to think my reading is better. I wouldn’t want to try and defend Qiaochu’s view if the second reading represents it.