If your reason for vegetarianism is mainly prevention of animal suffering, shouldn’t you be concentrating on ethical farming? Or are you against raising a happy cow and painlessly killing it some time later?
I don’t think so. I wouldn’t be against happy cows with painless deaths, but I think achieving that outcome, especially via the advocacy available to me, is very unlikely.
if you value happy animals, than you ought to value happy farm animals, and more vegetarianism results in fewer of those.
I don’t understand. This assumes there are happy farm animals. If any farm animals are happy, they’re certainly in the extreme minority.
It’s not clear to me that there are happy animals at all, for some species. Are there happy chickens? Happy cows? Where? (Can chickens or cows even be “happy” in the sense we understand happiness?)
Or is the conclusion that since the existence of these animals can only result in suffering, the outcome where farms animals stop existing is desirable?
Or is the conclusion that since the existence of these animals can only result in suffering, the outcome where farms animals stop existing is desirable?
I’m unsure if there are happy animals at all. Wild animal suffering also sounds pretty bad. But, at least for factory farmed animals, I agree that “the existence of these animals can only result in suffering, the outcome where farms animals stop existing is desirable”.
Yeah, wild animal suffering is the other thing I was thinking about. Anyway, that conclusion sounds pretty reasonable (given caring about animal suffering in the first place)… except that it seems to lead to wanting the entire animal kingdom to stop existing (or most of it, anyway). I’m not sure that’s a reductio ad absurdum, or if it is, what it’s a reductio of, exactly (caring about animal suffering? caring about suffering in general? utilitarianism?!), but it should at least give us pause. I don’t think this is a bullet I would bite.
For what it’s worth, given that I do care about humans, and given that some humans seem to be very bothered by the suffering of animals, I would certainly value the reduction of animal suffering for the purpose of making people feel better — although I don’t care about this enough to willingly incur significant personal or societal costs in the bargain. So, for instance, if in vitro meat became available, it tasted the same, cost no more (or only a little more), and made a lot of people feel better, that would, for me, be an important thing to consider.
But I think I value the existence of animal species, and ecologies, for their own sake. I’m not sure how to describe this; scientific curiosity? Valuing biological diversity? In any case, I think that, all else being equal, the extinction of entire kinds of creatures would be a sad outcome. (Although I can see a logical-extreme sort of counterargument: what if we create a new species explicitly for the purposes of easy torturability, and then torture them? They’ve been created from whole cloth simply to give us something to inflict pain on! Should we mourn their extinction? These hypothetical victimcows might be compared to actual cows in relevant ways. Of course, this argument does not work in the case of wild animal species.)
except that it seems to lead to wanting the entire animal kingdom to stop existing (or most of it, anyway).
I’m not sure that has to be the case. One could aim to provide adequate welfare for the entire animal kingdom, though that would require significant resources. Similarly, I think some human lives aren’t worth living, but I don’t think the proper response is genocide.
But, at least for factory farmed animals, I agree that “the existence of these animals can only result in suffering, the outcome where farms animals stop existing is desirable”.
I was merely extrapolating. Or do you think there are relevant differences between wild animals and domesticated ones, such that we could provide welfare, as it were, for wild animals (without them having to hunt/kill anything, I surmise is the implication), but not for domesticated ones? I mean, both of those scenarios are light-years away from feasibility, so I can only assume we’re talking about some in-principle difference. Are we?
I think there is a fundamental difference in wild animals and factory farmed animals—if factory farming were to stop, there would no longer be any factory farmed animals. They are created specifically for that purpose. One can’t provide welfare for factory farmed animals without stopping factory farming, and then there wouldn’t be any factory farmed animals.
Though, I suppose, one could raise animals in ideal welfare conditions and then painlessly kill them for food. I would be fine with that.
There’s something strange with your terms there… are you using “factory farmed” as a descriptor of… kinds (species, etc.) of animals? Or animals that happen to exist in conditions of factory farming? I am confused.
Factory farmed animals are animals that happen to exist in conditions of factory farming. And “factory farming” is meant to convey not just mass production, but also the present quality of farming with regard to animal welfare.
Do you see a difference between factory farming and other farming?
This comment seems to say that you don’t. The original post, by bothering to mention factory farming asserts that you do. But the rest of the post does not seem to reflect any conclusions drawn from such a belief.
If you are a consequentialist, not a deontologist and if non-factory animals suffer less than factory animals, you should take that into account, even if you believe that their lives are net negatives. But I think you should introspect about whether you really are a consequentialist.
Do you see a difference between factory farming and other farming?
Sort of. Different farms treat animals differently, and there are certainly some farms that treat animals well. But they’re all small, local farms and not a source of the majority of the meat.
Perhaps you’re suggesting that instead of pro-vegetarianism advocacy, we do pro-”farms that treat animals well” advocacy. The problem is, I suspect, it would take an awful, awful lot of money to first scale a farm large enough to get meat to everyone while still treating all the animals well.
If you are a consequentialist, not a deontologist and if non-factory animals suffer less than factory animals, you should take that into account, even if you believe that their lives are net negatives.
Can you explain how it’s not currently being taken into account and what effect you think it would have on the calculation? And why it might indicate some sort of hidden deontology on my part?
You seem driven by thresholds, like a good life and especially a good death and you do not seem interested in replacing a life of high suffering with a life of low suffering, just because the life of low suffering is a net negative. Such thresholds tend to be characteristic of deontologists.
In particular, I observed this on the thread about fish. Here I asked you about replacing worse farms with better but still bad farms and your response was that truly good farms are too expensive, ignoring the possibility of farms that are full of suffering, just lower levels of suffering.
Maybe it is implausible to change how farming is done (though I think you are mistaken about the diversity of practices), but getting people to switch from pork to beef or from chicken to fish seems quite plausible to me.
You seem driven by thresholds, like a good life and especially a good death and you do not seem interested in replacing a life of high suffering with a life of low suffering, just because the life of low suffering is a net negative.
What makes me look like I’m interested in thresholds? Replacing a life of high suffering with a life of low suffering is good. Replacing that same life of high suffering with a life of no suffering is even better.
~
Here I asked you about replacing worse farms with better but still bad farms and your response was that truly good farms are too expensive, ignoring the possibility of farms that are full of suffering, just lower levels of suffering.
I don’t understand how I ignored your point. Could you re-explain?
~
Maybe it is implausible to change how farming is done (though I think you are mistaken about the diversity of practices), but getting people to switch from pork to beef or from chicken to fish seems quite plausible to me.
I’ve strongly considered convincing people to shift away from chicken, eggs, and fish to other forms of meat, given arguments around suffering per kg of meat demanded. This is also why I’m personally a vegetarian and not a vegan.
I don’t think so. I wouldn’t be against happy cows with painless deaths, but I think achieving that outcome, especially via the advocacy available to me, is very unlikely.
I don’t understand. This assumes there are happy farm animals. If any farm animals are happy, they’re certainly in the extreme minority.
It’s not clear to me that there are happy animals at all, for some species. Are there happy chickens? Happy cows? Where? (Can chickens or cows even be “happy” in the sense we understand happiness?)
Or is the conclusion that since the existence of these animals can only result in suffering, the outcome where farms animals stop existing is desirable?
I’m unsure if there are happy animals at all. Wild animal suffering also sounds pretty bad. But, at least for factory farmed animals, I agree that “the existence of these animals can only result in suffering, the outcome where farms animals stop existing is desirable”.
Yeah, wild animal suffering is the other thing I was thinking about. Anyway, that conclusion sounds pretty reasonable (given caring about animal suffering in the first place)… except that it seems to lead to wanting the entire animal kingdom to stop existing (or most of it, anyway). I’m not sure that’s a reductio ad absurdum, or if it is, what it’s a reductio of, exactly (caring about animal suffering? caring about suffering in general? utilitarianism?!), but it should at least give us pause. I don’t think this is a bullet I would bite.
For what it’s worth, given that I do care about humans, and given that some humans seem to be very bothered by the suffering of animals, I would certainly value the reduction of animal suffering for the purpose of making people feel better — although I don’t care about this enough to willingly incur significant personal or societal costs in the bargain. So, for instance, if in vitro meat became available, it tasted the same, cost no more (or only a little more), and made a lot of people feel better, that would, for me, be an important thing to consider.
But I think I value the existence of animal species, and ecologies, for their own sake. I’m not sure how to describe this; scientific curiosity? Valuing biological diversity? In any case, I think that, all else being equal, the extinction of entire kinds of creatures would be a sad outcome. (Although I can see a logical-extreme sort of counterargument: what if we create a new species explicitly for the purposes of easy torturability, and then torture them? They’ve been created from whole cloth simply to give us something to inflict pain on! Should we mourn their extinction? These hypothetical victimcows might be compared to actual cows in relevant ways. Of course, this argument does not work in the case of wild animal species.)
I’m not sure that has to be the case. One could aim to provide adequate welfare for the entire animal kingdom, though that would require significant resources. Similarly, I think some human lives aren’t worth living, but I don’t think the proper response is genocide.
You said:
I was merely extrapolating. Or do you think there are relevant differences between wild animals and domesticated ones, such that we could provide welfare, as it were, for wild animals (without them having to hunt/kill anything, I surmise is the implication), but not for domesticated ones? I mean, both of those scenarios are light-years away from feasibility, so I can only assume we’re talking about some in-principle difference. Are we?
I think there is a fundamental difference in wild animals and factory farmed animals—if factory farming were to stop, there would no longer be any factory farmed animals. They are created specifically for that purpose. One can’t provide welfare for factory farmed animals without stopping factory farming, and then there wouldn’t be any factory farmed animals.
Though, I suppose, one could raise animals in ideal welfare conditions and then painlessly kill them for food. I would be fine with that.
There’s something strange with your terms there… are you using “factory farmed” as a descriptor of… kinds (species, etc.) of animals? Or animals that happen to exist in conditions of factory farming? I am confused.
Factory farmed animals are animals that happen to exist in conditions of factory farming. And “factory farming” is meant to convey not just mass production, but also the present quality of farming with regard to animal welfare.
Do you see a difference between factory farming and other farming?
This comment seems to say that you don’t. The original post, by bothering to mention factory farming asserts that you do. But the rest of the post does not seem to reflect any conclusions drawn from such a belief.
If you are a consequentialist, not a deontologist and if non-factory animals suffer less than factory animals, you should take that into account, even if you believe that their lives are net negatives. But I think you should introspect about whether you really are a consequentialist.
Sort of. Different farms treat animals differently, and there are certainly some farms that treat animals well. But they’re all small, local farms and not a source of the majority of the meat.
Perhaps you’re suggesting that instead of pro-vegetarianism advocacy, we do pro-”farms that treat animals well” advocacy. The problem is, I suspect, it would take an awful, awful lot of money to first scale a farm large enough to get meat to everyone while still treating all the animals well.
Can you explain how it’s not currently being taken into account and what effect you think it would have on the calculation? And why it might indicate some sort of hidden deontology on my part?
You seem driven by thresholds, like a good life and especially a good death and you do not seem interested in replacing a life of high suffering with a life of low suffering, just because the life of low suffering is a net negative. Such thresholds tend to be characteristic of deontologists.
In particular, I observed this on the thread about fish. Here I asked you about replacing worse farms with better but still bad farms and your response was that truly good farms are too expensive, ignoring the possibility of farms that are full of suffering, just lower levels of suffering.
Maybe it is implausible to change how farming is done (though I think you are mistaken about the diversity of practices), but getting people to switch from pork to beef or from chicken to fish seems quite plausible to me.
What makes me look like I’m interested in thresholds? Replacing a life of high suffering with a life of low suffering is good. Replacing that same life of high suffering with a life of no suffering is even better.
~
I don’t understand how I ignored your point. Could you re-explain?
~
I’ve strongly considered convincing people to shift away from chicken, eggs, and fish to other forms of meat, given arguments around suffering per kg of meat demanded. This is also why I’m personally a vegetarian and not a vegan.