The dividing lines between the kinds of cognitive states I’m inclined to call “moral intuitions” and the kinds of cognitive states I’m inclined to call “preferences” and the kinds of cognitive states I’m inclined to call “psychic distress” are not nearly as sharp, in my experience, as you seem to imply here. There’s a lot of overlap, and in particular the states I enter surrounding activities like killing animals (especially cute animals with big eyes) don’t fall crisply into just one category.
But, sure, if we restrict the discussion to activities where those categories are crisply separated, those distinctions are very useful.
The dividing lines between the kinds of cognitive states I’m inclined to call “moral intuitions” and the kinds of cognitive states I’m inclined to call “preferences” and the kinds of cognitive states I’m inclined to call “psychic distress” are not nearly as sharp, in my experience, as you seem to imply here. There’s a lot of overlap, and in particular the states I enter surrounding activities like killing animals (especially cute animals with big eyes) don’t fall crisply into just one category.
But, sure, if we restrict the discussion to activities where those categories are crisply separated, those distinctions are very useful.