I would be tempted to ascribe moral value to the prosthetic, not the fish.
Thinking about this… while I sympathize with the temptation, it does seem to me that the same mindset that leads me in this direction also leads me to ascribe moral values to human societies, rather than to individual humans.
It might be worth distinguishing a genetic condition on X from a constituting condition on X. So human society is certainly necessary to bring about the sapience and social capacities of human beings, but if you remove the human from the society once they’ve been brought up in the relevant way, they’re no less capable of social and sapient behavior.
On the other hand, the fish-prosthetic is part of what constitutes the fish’s capacity for social and sapient behavior. If the fish were removed from it, it would loose those capacities.
I think you could plausibly say that the prosthetic should be considered part of the basis for the moral worth of the fish (at the expense of the fish on its own), but refuse to say this about human societies (at the expense of individual human) in light of this distinction.
Hm. Well, I agree with considering the prosthetic part of the basis of the worth of the prosthetically augmented fish, as you suggest. And while I think we underestimate the importance of a continuing social framework for humans to be what we are, even as adults, I will agree that there’s some kind of meaningful threshold to be identified such that I can be removed from human society without immediately dropping below that threshold, and there’s an important difference (if perhaps not strictly a qualitative one) between me and the fish in this respect.
So, yeah, drawing this distinction allows me to ascribe moral value to individual adult humans (though not to very young children, I suppose), rather than entirely to their societies, even while embracing the general principle here.
Thinking about this… while I sympathize with the temptation, it does seem to me that the same mindset that leads me in this direction also leads me to ascribe moral values to human societies, rather than to individual humans.
I’m not yet sure what I want to do with that.
It might be worth distinguishing a genetic condition on X from a constituting condition on X. So human society is certainly necessary to bring about the sapience and social capacities of human beings, but if you remove the human from the society once they’ve been brought up in the relevant way, they’re no less capable of social and sapient behavior.
On the other hand, the fish-prosthetic is part of what constitutes the fish’s capacity for social and sapient behavior. If the fish were removed from it, it would loose those capacities.
I think you could plausibly say that the prosthetic should be considered part of the basis for the moral worth of the fish (at the expense of the fish on its own), but refuse to say this about human societies (at the expense of individual human) in light of this distinction.
Hm.
Well, I agree with considering the prosthetic part of the basis of the worth of the prosthetically augmented fish, as you suggest.
And while I think we underestimate the importance of a continuing social framework for humans to be what we are, even as adults, I will agree that there’s some kind of meaningful threshold to be identified such that I can be removed from human society without immediately dropping below that threshold, and there’s an important difference (if perhaps not strictly a qualitative one) between me and the fish in this respect.
So, yeah, drawing this distinction allows me to ascribe moral value to individual adult humans (though not to very young children, I suppose), rather than entirely to their societies, even while embracing the general principle here.
Fair enough.