I’m not going to respond to most of what you wrote here because I think this will be an unproductive discussion.
What I will say is that I think it would help to reevaluate how you’re defining all the terms that you’re using. Many of your disagreements with the OP essay are semantic in nature. I believe that you will arrive at a richer and more nuanced understanding of epistemology if you learn the definitions used in the OP essay and the author’s blog and use those terms to understand epistemology instead. Many of the things that you wrote in your comment seem confused.
As for how you’re using subjective and objective, I recognize that there are various dictionary definitions for those two terms, but I believe that the most coherent ones that are the most useful for explaining epistemology are the ones that specifically relate to the subject | object dichotomy. You’re disagreeing with the statement “knowledge is subjective” because you’re not defining “subjective” according to the subject | object dichotomy.
reevaluate how you’re defining all the terms that you’re using
Always a good idea. As for why I’m pointing to EV: epistemic justification and expected value both entail scoring rules for ways to adopt beliefs. Combining both into the same model makes it easier to discuss epistemic justification in situations with reasoners with arbitrary utility functions and states of awareness.
Knowledge as mutual information between two models induced by some unspecified causal pathway allows me to talk about knowledge in situations where beliefs could follow from arbitrary causal pathways. I would exclude from my definition of knowledge false beliefs instilled by an agent which still produce the correct predictions, and I’d ensure my definition includes mutual information induced by a genuine divine revelation. (which is to say, I reject epistemic justification as a dependency)
Removing the criterion of being a belief seems to redraw the boundary around a lot of simple systems, but I don’t necessarily see a problem with that. ‘True’ follows from mutual information.
you’re not defining “subjective” according to the subject | object dichotomy
Seems so. I’m happy to instead avoid making claims about knowledge related to the subject-object dichotomy, as none of the reasoning I’d endorse here conditions on consciousness.
I’m not going to respond to most of what you wrote here because I think this will be an unproductive discussion.
What I will say is that I think it would help to reevaluate how you’re defining all the terms that you’re using. Many of your disagreements with the OP essay are semantic in nature. I believe that you will arrive at a richer and more nuanced understanding of epistemology if you learn the definitions used in the OP essay and the author’s blog and use those terms to understand epistemology instead. Many of the things that you wrote in your comment seem confused.
As for how you’re using subjective and objective, I recognize that there are various dictionary definitions for those two terms, but I believe that the most coherent ones that are the most useful for explaining epistemology are the ones that specifically relate to the subject | object dichotomy. You’re disagreeing with the statement “knowledge is subjective” because you’re not defining “subjective” according to the subject | object dichotomy.
I’ve also written a webpage that might help some of these concepts. You mentioned JTB in your response, and I’ve written a section explaining why JTB is not an adequate way to define knowledge at all.
Always a good idea. As for why I’m pointing to EV: epistemic justification and expected value both entail scoring rules for ways to adopt beliefs. Combining both into the same model makes it easier to discuss epistemic justification in situations with reasoners with arbitrary utility functions and states of awareness.
Knowledge as mutual information between two models induced by some unspecified causal pathway allows me to talk about knowledge in situations where beliefs could follow from arbitrary causal pathways. I would exclude from my definition of knowledge false beliefs instilled by an agent which still produce the correct predictions, and I’d ensure my definition includes mutual information induced by a genuine divine revelation. (which is to say, I reject epistemic justification as a dependency)
Removing the criterion of being a belief seems to redraw the boundary around a lot of simple systems, but I don’t necessarily see a problem with that. ‘True’ follows from mutual information.
Seems so. I’m happy to instead avoid making claims about knowledge related to the subject-object dichotomy, as none of the reasoning I’d endorse here conditions on consciousness.