Well the decision theory is only applied after assessing the available options, so it won’t tell you to do things you aren’t capable of doing.
I suppose the bamboozle here is that it is that it seems like a DT question, but, as you point out, it’s actually a question about physics. However, even in this thread, people dismiss any questions about that as being “not important”, and instead try to focus on the decision theory, which isn’t actually relevant here.
For example:
I generally think that free will is not so relevant in Newcomb’s problem. It seems that whether there is some entity somewhere in the world that can predict what I’m doing shouldn’t make a difference for whether I have free will or not, at least if this entity isn’t revealing its predictions to me before I choose.
What use is a decision theory that tells you to do things you can’t do?
Maybe the paradox is bamboozling, maybe it’s deconfusing—revealing that DT depends on physics and metaphysics, not just maths.
Well the decision theory is only applied after assessing the available options, so it won’t tell you to do things you aren’t capable of doing.
I suppose the bamboozle here is that it is that it seems like a DT question, but, as you point out, it’s actually a question about physics. However, even in this thread, people dismiss any questions about that as being “not important”, and instead try to focus on the decision theory, which isn’t actually relevant here.
For example: