Jason Mitchell writes in “On the emptiness of failed replications” that there certain knowledge you need to replicate experiments that’s not in the paper:
I have a particular cookbook that I love, and even though I follow the recipes as closely as I can, the food somehow never quite looks as good as it does in the photos. Does this mean that the recipes are deficient, perhaps even that the authors have misrepresented the quality of their food? Or could it be that there is more to great cooking than simply following a recipe? I do wish the authors would specify how many millimeters constitutes a “thinly” sliced onion, or the maximum torque allowed when “fluffing” rice, or even just the acceptable range in degrees Fahrenheit for “medium” heat. They don’t, because they assume that I share tacit knowledge of certain culinary conventions and techniques;
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Likewise, there is more to being a successful experimenter than merely following what’s printed in a method section. Experimenters develop a sense, honed over many years, of how to use a method successfully. Much of this knowledge is implicit. Collecting meaningful neuroimaging data, for example, requires that participants remain near-motionless during scanning, and thus in my lab, we go through great lengths to encourage participants to keep still. We whine about how we will have spent a lot of money for nothing if they move, we plead with them not to sneeze or cough or wiggle their foot while in the scanner, and we deliver frequent pep talks and reminders throughout the session.
How best to give those pep talks would be an example.
Yes I think even in math a lot of what is called “mathematical sophistication” is implicit knowledge that’s hard to communicate without being steeped in the social context in which math is developed and read.
It’s hard to explain, it’s the way you think and talk about math, it’s not about visible signs like notation.
I like the Scott Bakker analogy for magic, there is the visible part of math (formulas, etc.), and the corresponding mental habits. The visible part without the correct way of thinking behind the scenes doesn’t work.
I guess one example is an ontology of “the type of math that’s being done” in one’s head, that lets people quickly figure out what the paper is trying to do after reading relatively little of it.
Jason Mitchell writes in “On the emptiness of failed replications” that there certain knowledge you need to replicate experiments that’s not in the paper:
How best to give those pep talks would be an example.
Yes I think even in math a lot of what is called “mathematical sophistication” is implicit knowledge that’s hard to communicate without being steeped in the social context in which math is developed and read.
As an example, do you mean something like correctly understanding how to “abuse” mathematical notation in a way that remains rigorous?
It’s hard to explain, it’s the way you think and talk about math, it’s not about visible signs like notation.
I like the Scott Bakker analogy for magic, there is the visible part of math (formulas, etc.), and the corresponding mental habits. The visible part without the correct way of thinking behind the scenes doesn’t work.
I guess one example is an ontology of “the type of math that’s being done” in one’s head, that lets people quickly figure out what the paper is trying to do after reading relatively little of it.
The guy is profoundly misguided about the purpose of food X-D
And food photography is a specialized and lucrative field for a reason.