As I understand it, your argument is that the efficient market hypothesis can be used to make it easier to make money, under some circumstances. If you have private information about an asset (favorable or unfavorable), and pricing is efficient, then you expect to make money (going long or short respectively) with no additional information about the underlying price of that asset. In other words, arbitrageurs make money on anticipating expected changes in relative pricing, not on knowing the true value of things.
What makes employment decisions hard is that there is no analogue to the public market-clearing price, so instead, in order to use private information, you need to be able to approximate what the baseline market decision would have been.
An additional complication it might be worth disentangling: in employment, you aren’t purchasing for resale, you’re purchasing for use. Cf. speculating on housing prices vs buying a house to live in.
As I understand it, your argument is that the efficient market hypothesis can be used to make it easier to make money, under some circumstances. If you have private information about an asset (favorable or unfavorable), and pricing is efficient, then you expect to make money (going long or short respectively) with no additional information about the underlying price of that asset. In other words, arbitrageurs make money on anticipating expected changes in relative pricing, not on knowing the true value of things.
What makes employment decisions hard is that there is no analogue to the public market-clearing price, so instead, in order to use private information, you need to be able to approximate what the baseline market decision would have been.
An additional complication it might be worth disentangling: in employment, you aren’t purchasing for resale, you’re purchasing for use. Cf. speculating on housing prices vs buying a house to live in.