Hm. At first glance this feels like a “1” game to me, if they both use the “take the strictly dominant action” solution concept. The alignment changes if they make decisions differently, but under the standard rationality assumptions, it feels like a perfectly aligned game.
So, given this payoff matrix (where P1 picks a row and gets the first payout, P2 picks column and gets 2nd payout):
5 / 0 ; 5 / 100
0 / 100 ; 0 / 1
Would you say P1′s action furthers the interest of player 2?
Would P2′s action further the interest of player 1?
Where would you rank this game on the 0 − 1 scale?
Hm. At first glance this feels like a “1” game to me, if they both use the “take the strictly dominant action” solution concept. The alignment changes if they make decisions differently, but under the standard rationality assumptions, it feels like a perfectly aligned game.