Good points. I share your concern. But it’s not clear which direction rationality cuts in this case. If I have no special attachment to the “me” of one year from now, why should I sacrifice present interests for his? On the other hand, I’ve been wondering recently if it’s possible to salvage our folk concept of identity by positing that, while “me” at T2 might not be “me” in any robust sense, 1). there will be a person (or locus of consciousness, if you will) at T2 who thinks he’s me, and shares many of my memories and behavioral predispositions, and 2). that person will be disproportionately influenced by my actions today. I think it follows from ethical considerations, then, if not prudential ones, that I should act today in a way that is in keeping with my best interests, so as not to unduly harm that future person.
Now, what would really be interesting would be if we discovered that the “rational” thing to do would be some averaging of the two extremes—i.e., I continue to act generally in my future best interests, but also prioritize present and near-term happiness to a much greater degree than seems naively appropriate.
Good points. I share your concern. But it’s not clear which direction rationality cuts in this case. If I have no special attachment to the “me” of one year from now, why should I sacrifice present interests for his? On the other hand, I’ve been wondering recently if it’s possible to salvage our folk concept of identity by positing that, while “me” at T2 might not be “me” in any robust sense, 1). there will be a person (or locus of consciousness, if you will) at T2 who thinks he’s me, and shares many of my memories and behavioral predispositions, and 2). that person will be disproportionately influenced by my actions today. I think it follows from ethical considerations, then, if not prudential ones, that I should act today in a way that is in keeping with my best interests, so as not to unduly harm that future person.
Now, what would really be interesting would be if we discovered that the “rational” thing to do would be some averaging of the two extremes—i.e., I continue to act generally in my future best interests, but also prioritize present and near-term happiness to a much greater degree than seems naively appropriate.