Thanks! Do consequentialist kind of port the first axiom (completeness) from the VN-M utility theorem, changing it from decision theory to meta-ethics?
And for others, to put my original question another way: before we start comparing utilons or utility functions, insofar as consequentialists begin with moral intuitions and reason the existence of utility, is one of their starting intuitions that all moral questions have correct answers? Or am I just making this up? And has anybody written about this?
To put that in one popular context: in the Trolley Switch and Fat Man problem, it seems like most people start with the assumption that there exists a right answer (or preferable, or best, whatever your terminology), and that it could never be the case that an agent will do the wrong/immoral/unethical thing no matter what he or she chooses. Am I right that this assumption exists?
it could never be the case that an agent will do the wrong/immoral/unethical thing no matter what he or she chooses.
Most people do have this belief. I think it’s a safe one, though. It follows from a substantive belief most people have, which is that agents are only morally responsible for things that are under their control.
In the context of a trolley problem, it’s stipulated that the person is being confronted with a choice—in the context of the problem, they have to choose. And so it would be blaming them for something beyond their control to say “no matter what you do, you are blameworthy.”
One way to fight the hypothetical of the trolley problem is to say “people are rarely confronted with this sort of moral dilemma involuntarily, and it’s evil to to put yourself in a position of choosing between evils.” I suppose for consistency, if you say this, you should avoid jury service, voting, or political office.
Thanks! Do consequentialist kind of port the first axiom (completeness) from the VN-M utility theorem, changing it from decision theory to meta-ethics?
Not explicitly (except in the case of some utilitarians), but I don’t think many would deny it. The boundaries between meta-ethics and normative ethics are vaguer than you’d think, but consequentialism is already sort of metaethical. The VMN theorem isn’t explicitly discussed that often (many ethicists won’t have heard of it), but the axioms are fairly intuitive anyway. However, although I don’t know enough about weird forms of consequentialism to know if anyone’s made a point of denying completeness, I wouldn’t be that surprised if that position exists.
To put that in one popular context: in the Trolley Switch and Fat Man problem, it seems like most people start with the assumption that there exists a right answer (or preferable, or best, whatever your terminology), and that it could never be the case that an agent will do the wrong/immoral/unethical thing no matter what he or she chooses. Am I right that this assumption exists?
Yes, I think it certainly exists. I’m not sure if it’s universal or not, but I haven’t read a great deal on the subject yet, you I’m not sure if I would know.
Thanks! Do consequentialist kind of port the first axiom (completeness) from the VN-M utility theorem, changing it from decision theory to meta-ethics?
And for others, to put my original question another way: before we start comparing utilons or utility functions, insofar as consequentialists begin with moral intuitions and reason the existence of utility, is one of their starting intuitions that all moral questions have correct answers? Or am I just making this up? And has anybody written about this?
To put that in one popular context: in the Trolley Switch and Fat Man problem, it seems like most people start with the assumption that there exists a right answer (or preferable, or best, whatever your terminology), and that it could never be the case that an agent will do the wrong/immoral/unethical thing no matter what he or she chooses. Am I right that this assumption exists?
Most people do have this belief. I think it’s a safe one, though. It follows from a substantive belief most people have, which is that agents are only morally responsible for things that are under their control.
In the context of a trolley problem, it’s stipulated that the person is being confronted with a choice—in the context of the problem, they have to choose. And so it would be blaming them for something beyond their control to say “no matter what you do, you are blameworthy.”
One way to fight the hypothetical of the trolley problem is to say “people are rarely confronted with this sort of moral dilemma involuntarily, and it’s evil to to put yourself in a position of choosing between evils.” I suppose for consistency, if you say this, you should avoid jury service, voting, or political office.
Not explicitly (except in the case of some utilitarians), but I don’t think many would deny it. The boundaries between meta-ethics and normative ethics are vaguer than you’d think, but consequentialism is already sort of metaethical. The VMN theorem isn’t explicitly discussed that often (many ethicists won’t have heard of it), but the axioms are fairly intuitive anyway. However, although I don’t know enough about weird forms of consequentialism to know if anyone’s made a point of denying completeness, I wouldn’t be that surprised if that position exists.
Yes, I think it certainly exists. I’m not sure if it’s universal or not, but I haven’t read a great deal on the subject yet, you I’m not sure if I would know.