Civil Rights (1940-1960 edition) has clear support from some political elites, and that explains a substantial amount of the progress in that time period.
But the change in elite positions from 1900 to 1940 needs explanation. Once, there was relatively little institutional support of civil rights. For example, Strauder v. West Virginia is basically a roadmap of what to say to “justify” Jim Crow. The change in institutional support needs some explanation, which is hard to come up with if the only thing that causes changes is institutional support.
Clearly, the elite opinion changes gradually over time for all sorts of reasons, sometimes unclear and puzzling. Often there are also conflicts within the elite (sometimes further complicated by foreign influences), which may lead to sudden and unexpected developments. My above comments assume that the state of affairs is stable in the short run, and that the contrarians in question face uniform opposition from the elite.
As for the specific changes in the U.S. elite’s positions in the first half of the 20th century, I don’t have a ready answer, even though I am reasonably familiar with the relevant history. I have seen multiple theories espoused by different people, but none has struck me as clearly correct, and I can only speculate how they might be fit together. However, I don’t think any part of these historical developments involved contrarians winning through public activism while faced with a uniformly hostile elite.
However, I don’t think any part of these historical developments involves contrarians winning through public activism while faced with a uniformly hostile elite.
I think that some activism is necessary, but not close to sufficient, to cause certain kinds of social change. At least in a post-Enlightenment society (i.e. a society that pays any attention to the concept of “consent of the governed”).
I think that “consent of the governed” is a concept too incoherent to be salvageable. After all, the very purpose of government is to do things that are arguably necessary but can’t be done consensually, and that circle simply cannot be squared.
As for activism in general, I didn’t mean to say that activism is necessarily without influence. What happens in reality is some sort of interplay between the activism and the dynamics of the intra-elite conflict, whose exact nature varies greatly between different cases. But some degree of elite support and participation is always involved whenever activism doesn’t get routinely suppressed or laughed off.
I think that “consent of the governed” is a concept too incoherent to be salvageable. After all, the very purpose of government is to do things that are arguably necessary but can’t be done consensually, and that circle simply cannot be squared.
Absurd. The issue of consent versus trust arises in all group dynamics that involve a leader (see e.g. Eliezer’s take on rationalist militia). You simply need to taboo “consent” here, and it’ll become clear that it’s just different levels of willingness to go along with unpopular measures that happen in society: direct approval due to strategic or value-related concerns → conformity-fuelled acceptance → acceptance under active propaganda/promises/etc → drawing upon any residual tolerance but cranking up the pressure indicators for the elites to see → … if a point is reached when the “consent” finally breaks down, for any situational definition of consent , that’s usually pretty noticeable to an astute observer.
Civil Rights (1940-1960 edition) has clear support from some political elites, and that explains a substantial amount of the progress in that time period.
But the change in elite positions from 1900 to 1940 needs explanation. Once, there was relatively little institutional support of civil rights. For example, Strauder v. West Virginia is basically a roadmap of what to say to “justify” Jim Crow. The change in institutional support needs some explanation, which is hard to come up with if the only thing that causes changes is institutional support.
Clearly, the elite opinion changes gradually over time for all sorts of reasons, sometimes unclear and puzzling. Often there are also conflicts within the elite (sometimes further complicated by foreign influences), which may lead to sudden and unexpected developments. My above comments assume that the state of affairs is stable in the short run, and that the contrarians in question face uniform opposition from the elite.
As for the specific changes in the U.S. elite’s positions in the first half of the 20th century, I don’t have a ready answer, even though I am reasonably familiar with the relevant history. I have seen multiple theories espoused by different people, but none has struck me as clearly correct, and I can only speculate how they might be fit together. However, I don’t think any part of these historical developments involved contrarians winning through public activism while faced with a uniformly hostile elite.
I think that some activism is necessary, but not close to sufficient, to cause certain kinds of social change. At least in a post-Enlightenment society (i.e. a society that pays any attention to the concept of “consent of the governed”).
I think that “consent of the governed” is a concept too incoherent to be salvageable. After all, the very purpose of government is to do things that are arguably necessary but can’t be done consensually, and that circle simply cannot be squared.
As for activism in general, I didn’t mean to say that activism is necessarily without influence. What happens in reality is some sort of interplay between the activism and the dynamics of the intra-elite conflict, whose exact nature varies greatly between different cases. But some degree of elite support and participation is always involved whenever activism doesn’t get routinely suppressed or laughed off.
Absurd. The issue of consent versus trust arises in all group dynamics that involve a leader (see e.g. Eliezer’s take on rationalist militia). You simply need to taboo “consent” here, and it’ll become clear that it’s just different levels of willingness to go along with unpopular measures that happen in society: direct approval due to strategic or value-related concerns → conformity-fuelled acceptance → acceptance under active propaganda/promises/etc → drawing upon any residual tolerance but cranking up the pressure indicators for the elites to see → … if a point is reached when the “consent” finally breaks down, for any situational definition of consent , that’s usually pretty noticeable to an astute observer.