I would guess the answer is in the prediction in between the Clinton and Sanders nomination predictions: “Hillary to be indicted on criminal charges: 50%”. Presumably that would hurt her chances of nomination.
Some of these figures seem implausible to me. The US presidential predictions are fairly strange, but others are worse. 63% probability of a 60%-80% decline in stock prices within two years? Really? (And, given that, why so little probability attached to a smaller decline? What’s the underlying model here?) And what exactly is OrphanWilde’s mental model of the WHO’s attitude to US healthcare, that predicts such a huge influence of the existence of a US national health database on how the WHO assesses countries’ health?
I would guess the answer is in the prediction in between the Clinton and Sanders nomination predictions: “Hillary to be indicted on criminal charges: 50%”. Presumably that would hurt her chances of nomination.
This isn’t the whole of it, but it contributes, along with personal issues Clinton is struggling with. The bigger issue is that the coalition is fractured. If Sanders weren’t playing softball against Hillary, it wouldn’t even be a question, but I think he believes playing hard politics against her would damage his chances against Trump by fracturing the Democratic coalition along gendered lines. The Democratic coalition is at its weakest leaving a Democratic presidency, since anything they have achieved results in a less interested coalition member group whose goals are already at least partially achieved, and anything they haven’t achieved results in a frustrated coalition member group whose goals were perceived to be passed over.
United, the Democrats win; their coalition is larger than the Republican base. Unfortunately, they’re at their least united right now, and Sanders can’t afford to fracture them any further. Hillary, on the other hand, seems perfectly happy to weaken the coalition in order to win the nomination.
anything they have achieved results in a less interested coalition member group [...] anything they haven’t achieved results in a frustrated coalition member group
Seems fairly plausible, but why put this specifically in terms of the Democrats? The same will apply to the Republicans, or any other party anywhere whose support comes from anything other than a perfectly homogeneous group.
Hillary, on the other hand, seems perfectly happy to weaken the coalition in order to win the nomination.
On the face of it, that should make her more likely to get nominated. Are you suggesting that the Democratic Party’s electorate is sufficiently calculating to reason: “She’s doing these things to get nominated, they seem likely to piss off Sanders supporters, that will hurt us in the general election, so I won’t vote for her in the primary”? Colour me unconvinced.
Seems fairly plausible, but why put this specifically in terms of the Democrats? The same will apply to the Republicans, or any other party anywhere whose support comes from anything other than a perfectly homogeneous group.
The Republicans are less of a coalition than the Democrats, and more an alliance of two groups; social conservatives, and economic liberals.
On the face of it, that should make her more likely to get nominated. Are you suggesting that the Democratic Party’s electorate is sufficiently calculating to reason: “She’s doing these things to get nominated, they seem likely to piss off Sanders supporters, that will hurt us in the general election, so I won’t vote for her in the primary”? Colour me unconvinced.
This isn’t why Sanders will win, this is why he’s still behind. It’s a short-term strategy, however, which she started too soon; the primary voters aren’t going to vote against Hillary because they don’t think they’ll win in the general election, they’re going to vote against Hillary because she’s alienated them to pander to her base.
The Republicans are less of a coalition than the Democrats
So what? If your argument is “if they achieve group G’s goals, group G will be unmotivated because they’ve already got what they need; if they don’t, group G will be unmotivated because they’ll think they’ve been neglected”, surely this applies whether group G is 10% of the party’s support or 50%.
I don’t see the relevance of the question. The argument wasn’t “It’s difficult for the Democrats to do things that will please all their supporters, because their supporters are a motley coalition of groups that want different things”. It was “Support for the Democrats will be weak in this situation, because each group will be demotivated for one reason if they’ve got what they want and demotivated for a different reason if they haven’t got what they want”.
It’s relevant. A given Democrat is likely a Democrat for their one issue; on all other issues, they tend to revert to the mean (which is why, historically, Democrats tend to rate their party lower on listening to the base than the Republicans do). The Democratic platform is a collection of concessions and compromises between the different coalitions, and is attractive only because of a given coalition’s particular interests; the rest of what it offers isn’t particularly attractive to its constituents.
Republican objectives tend to be more in-line with what its constituents want, since it is only catering to a couple of different factions. It isn’t invulnerable, of course, as we see right now with the fight between the conservatives and the pragmatists in the party, but is more resilient to this.
The outcome is a Republican base that generally-consistently turns out, and a Democratic base that turns out only when they feel they are losing.
The moderates, meanwhile, swing back and forth based on whoever has annoyed them the most recently. Since the party that isn’t in power can’t do much to annoy them, and things that have happened are more salient than things that might happen, you get elections that swing from party to party each election cycle. With increasing media exposure (both through the traditional media since Watergate, and the Internet more recently), they’re increasingly aware of the smallest annoyances, which is accelerating the process.
Republican objectives tend to be more in-line with what its constituents want [...] The outcome is a Republican base that generally-consistently turns out, and a Democratic base that turns out only when they feel they are losing.
This may all be correct, but it seems to me an entirely different argument from the one you made before and on which I was commenting.
63% probability of a 60%-80% decline in stock prices within two years? Really? (And, given that, why so little probability attached to a smaller decline? What’s the underlying model here?)
Systemic overvaluation of stocks relative to risk as a result of tax benefits combined with overdue bills from the last three economic shocks. The full extent of the drop will require including inflation in consideration.
And what exactly is OrphanWilde’s mental model of the WHO’s attitude to US healthcare, that predicts such a huge influence of the existence of a US national health database on how the WHO assesses countries’ health?
It’s not the WHO’s attitude towards US healthcare, it’s a difference in attitudes towards national pride between the US and… everybody else. In the US, outward patriotism is combined with criticism of our institutions; representatives of the US are all-too-happy to say what we should do better, but still insist we’re great anyways. Elsewhere, it’s dangerous and right-wing (in the European rather than US sense) to be outwardly patriotic (unless the government is dangerously right-wing already, which is to say, requires patriotism of this form), but that gets combined with a resentment of any implication that there’s anything wrong with their country or culture.
So ranking systems tend to accentuate the things Europe (which is powerful enough to get its say) does well (such as national health databases, repeatedly, for every category of health) while making sure the US ranks below them so they can say they’re doing better than the central modern superpower (because Asia doesn’t count and nobody wants to annoy China).
What I don’t understand is that you can attach a 63% probability to a decline of at least 60%, but at most a 7% probability to a decline of, let’s say, 20%-60% (can we agree that a 20% decline would count as a “market slump”?).
while making sure the US ranks below them
So, in fact, it is the WHO’s attitude towards US healthcare that’s relevant here. Anyway, your cynicism is noted but I can’t say I find your argument in any way convincing. (In fact, my own cynicism makes me wonder what your motive is for looking for explanations for the US’s poor ranking other than the obvious one, namely that the US actually doesn’t do healthcare terribly well despite spending so much.)
The Wikipedia page on this stuff says that the WHO hasn’t been publishing rankings since 2000 (which I think actually makes your prediction pretty meaningless), and that the factors it purports to weigh up are health as measured by disability-adjusted life expectancy, responsiveness as measured by “speed of service, protection of privacy, and quality of amenities”, and what people have to pay. I don’t see anything in there that cares about national health databases (except in so far as they advance those other very reasonable-sounding goals).
What I don’t understand is that you can attach a 63% probability to a decline of at least 60%, but at most a 7% probability to a decline of, let’s say, 20%-60% (can we agree that a 20% decline would count as a “market slump”?).
They’re separate predictions.
The Wikipedia page on this stuff says that the WHO hasn’t been publishing rankings since 2000 (which I think actually makes your prediction pretty meaningless), and that the factors it purports to weigh up are health as measured by disability-adjusted life expectancy, responsiveness as measured by “speed of service, protection of privacy, and quality of amenities”, and what people have to pay. I don’t see anything in there that cares about national health databases (except in so far as they advance those other very reasonable-sounding goals).
I went through its ranking criteria about a decade ago, and the database thing came up in every single ranking, dropping even our top-caliber cancer treatment to merely average.
(And the real weirdness here, actually, comes from the second prediction more or less on its own.)
It’s not that weird. Think about predicting the size of the explosion of a factory filled with open barrels of gasoline and oxygen tanks. I think the global economy is filled with the economic equivalent of open barrels of gasoline.
Interesting. Do you have more information?
Not at the moment. It’s been literally years since I’ve done any serious research on global healthcare. (Working in the health industry tends to make you stop wanting to study it as a hobby.)
I think the global economy is filled with the economic equivalent of open barrels of gasoline.
So (if I’m understanding your analogy right) you expect that any drop in the market will almost certainly lead to a huge crash?
From the 17th to the 25th of August last year, the S&P 500 dropped by about 11%. This led to … about a month of generally depressed prices, followed by a month-long rise up to their previous levels. That doesn’t sound to me like an economy filled with open barrels of gasoline.
So (if I’m understanding your analogy right) you expect that any drop in the market will almost certainly lead to a huge crash?
Any given spark -could- set it off, which is not the same as any given spark definitely setting it off.
From the 17th to the 25th of August last year, the S&P 500 dropped by about 11%. This led to … about a month of generally depressed prices, followed by a month-long rise up to their previous levels. That doesn’t sound to me like an economy filled with open barrels of gasoline.
If the stock market were responding appropriately to the conditions, then there wouldn’t be the equivalent of open barrels of gasoline all over the place. The issue is more structural than that: Interest rates and limited investment opportunities have driven money into the markets, driving prices up, and then keeping them artificially high. Some of this pressure has been relieved by amassing inventory, but that’s reached its stopping point, which is starting to cause international trade to falter.
If Pr(crash|drop) is not quite large, then Pr(smallish decline|any decline) should be reasonably big. Each observation of a drop without a crash is (some) evidence against the antecedent.
If the stock market were responding appropriately to the conditions
It sounds as if you think I was assuming that it is or should be, and I’m not sure why. Could you explain?
If Pr(crash|drop) is not quite large, then Pr(smallish decline|any decline) should be reasonably big. Each observation of a drop without a crash is (some) evidence against the antecedent.
Each time you strike a match without blowing up might be evidence that you’re not in a building full of gasoline, but if you see the gasoline, the match-striking evidence doesn’t weigh nearly as heavily.
I was slightly more specific in another question chain about what I meant by slump, and a 10% drop isn’t quite what I had in mind (neither is today’s slump, which could rally again), which was more along the lines of a recession.
To clarify my prediction: I expect at least a recession. Given a recession, I expect a depression. If we don’t get a recession (which would surprise me somewhat), the absence of a depression won’t surprise me, but if we do get a recession, the absence of a depression will surprise me a lot.
I would guess the answer is in the prediction in between the Clinton and Sanders nomination predictions: “Hillary to be indicted on criminal charges: 50%”. Presumably that would hurt her chances of nomination.
Some of these figures seem implausible to me. The US presidential predictions are fairly strange, but others are worse. 63% probability of a 60%-80% decline in stock prices within two years? Really? (And, given that, why so little probability attached to a smaller decline? What’s the underlying model here?) And what exactly is OrphanWilde’s mental model of the WHO’s attitude to US healthcare, that predicts such a huge influence of the existence of a US national health database on how the WHO assesses countries’ health?
This isn’t the whole of it, but it contributes, along with personal issues Clinton is struggling with. The bigger issue is that the coalition is fractured. If Sanders weren’t playing softball against Hillary, it wouldn’t even be a question, but I think he believes playing hard politics against her would damage his chances against Trump by fracturing the Democratic coalition along gendered lines. The Democratic coalition is at its weakest leaving a Democratic presidency, since anything they have achieved results in a less interested coalition member group whose goals are already at least partially achieved, and anything they haven’t achieved results in a frustrated coalition member group whose goals were perceived to be passed over.
United, the Democrats win; their coalition is larger than the Republican base. Unfortunately, they’re at their least united right now, and Sanders can’t afford to fracture them any further. Hillary, on the other hand, seems perfectly happy to weaken the coalition in order to win the nomination.
Seems fairly plausible, but why put this specifically in terms of the Democrats? The same will apply to the Republicans, or any other party anywhere whose support comes from anything other than a perfectly homogeneous group.
On the face of it, that should make her more likely to get nominated. Are you suggesting that the Democratic Party’s electorate is sufficiently calculating to reason: “She’s doing these things to get nominated, they seem likely to piss off Sanders supporters, that will hurt us in the general election, so I won’t vote for her in the primary”? Colour me unconvinced.
The Republicans are less of a coalition than the Democrats, and more an alliance of two groups; social conservatives, and economic liberals.
This isn’t why Sanders will win, this is why he’s still behind. It’s a short-term strategy, however, which she started too soon; the primary voters aren’t going to vote against Hillary because they don’t think they’ll win in the general election, they’re going to vote against Hillary because she’s alienated them to pander to her base.
So what? If your argument is “if they achieve group G’s goals, group G will be unmotivated because they’ve already got what they need; if they don’t, group G will be unmotivated because they’ll think they’ve been neglected”, surely this applies whether group G is 10% of the party’s support or 50%.
Which is easier: Ordering food that ten people need to agree upon, or ordering food that two people need to agree upon?
I don’t see the relevance of the question. The argument wasn’t “It’s difficult for the Democrats to do things that will please all their supporters, because their supporters are a motley coalition of groups that want different things”. It was “Support for the Democrats will be weak in this situation, because each group will be demotivated for one reason if they’ve got what they want and demotivated for a different reason if they haven’t got what they want”.
It’s relevant. A given Democrat is likely a Democrat for their one issue; on all other issues, they tend to revert to the mean (which is why, historically, Democrats tend to rate their party lower on listening to the base than the Republicans do). The Democratic platform is a collection of concessions and compromises between the different coalitions, and is attractive only because of a given coalition’s particular interests; the rest of what it offers isn’t particularly attractive to its constituents.
Republican objectives tend to be more in-line with what its constituents want, since it is only catering to a couple of different factions. It isn’t invulnerable, of course, as we see right now with the fight between the conservatives and the pragmatists in the party, but is more resilient to this.
The outcome is a Republican base that generally-consistently turns out, and a Democratic base that turns out only when they feel they are losing.
The moderates, meanwhile, swing back and forth based on whoever has annoyed them the most recently. Since the party that isn’t in power can’t do much to annoy them, and things that have happened are more salient than things that might happen, you get elections that swing from party to party each election cycle. With increasing media exposure (both through the traditional media since Watergate, and the Internet more recently), they’re increasingly aware of the smallest annoyances, which is accelerating the process.
This may all be correct, but it seems to me an entirely different argument from the one you made before and on which I was commenting.
Systemic overvaluation of stocks relative to risk as a result of tax benefits combined with overdue bills from the last three economic shocks. The full extent of the drop will require including inflation in consideration.
It’s not the WHO’s attitude towards US healthcare, it’s a difference in attitudes towards national pride between the US and… everybody else. In the US, outward patriotism is combined with criticism of our institutions; representatives of the US are all-too-happy to say what we should do better, but still insist we’re great anyways. Elsewhere, it’s dangerous and right-wing (in the European rather than US sense) to be outwardly patriotic (unless the government is dangerously right-wing already, which is to say, requires patriotism of this form), but that gets combined with a resentment of any implication that there’s anything wrong with their country or culture.
So ranking systems tend to accentuate the things Europe (which is powerful enough to get its say) does well (such as national health databases, repeatedly, for every category of health) while making sure the US ranks below them so they can say they’re doing better than the central modern superpower (because Asia doesn’t count and nobody wants to annoy China).
What I don’t understand is that you can attach a 63% probability to a decline of at least 60%, but at most a 7% probability to a decline of, let’s say, 20%-60% (can we agree that a 20% decline would count as a “market slump”?).
So, in fact, it is the WHO’s attitude towards US healthcare that’s relevant here. Anyway, your cynicism is noted but I can’t say I find your argument in any way convincing. (In fact, my own cynicism makes me wonder what your motive is for looking for explanations for the US’s poor ranking other than the obvious one, namely that the US actually doesn’t do healthcare terribly well despite spending so much.)
The Wikipedia page on this stuff says that the WHO hasn’t been publishing rankings since 2000 (which I think actually makes your prediction pretty meaningless), and that the factors it purports to weigh up are health as measured by disability-adjusted life expectancy, responsiveness as measured by “speed of service, protection of privacy, and quality of amenities”, and what people have to pay. I don’t see anything in there that cares about national health databases (except in so far as they advance those other very reasonable-sounding goals).
They’re separate predictions.
I went through its ranking criteria about a decade ago, and the database thing came up in every single ranking, dropping even our top-caliber cancer treatment to merely average.
So what? If you hold that
Pr(slump) ~= 0.7
Pr(decline >= 60% | slump) ~= 0.9
then you necessarily think there’s at least a ~63% probability of at least 60% decline and at most a ~7% probability of a decline between 20% and 60%.
(And the real weirdness here, actually, comes from the second prediction more or less on its own.)
Interesting. Do you have more information?
It’s not that weird. Think about predicting the size of the explosion of a factory filled with open barrels of gasoline and oxygen tanks. I think the global economy is filled with the economic equivalent of open barrels of gasoline.
Not at the moment. It’s been literally years since I’ve done any serious research on global healthcare. (Working in the health industry tends to make you stop wanting to study it as a hobby.)
So (if I’m understanding your analogy right) you expect that any drop in the market will almost certainly lead to a huge crash?
From the 17th to the 25th of August last year, the S&P 500 dropped by about 11%. This led to … about a month of generally depressed prices, followed by a month-long rise up to their previous levels. That doesn’t sound to me like an economy filled with open barrels of gasoline.
Any given spark -could- set it off, which is not the same as any given spark definitely setting it off.
If the stock market were responding appropriately to the conditions, then there wouldn’t be the equivalent of open barrels of gasoline all over the place. The issue is more structural than that: Interest rates and limited investment opportunities have driven money into the markets, driving prices up, and then keeping them artificially high. Some of this pressure has been relieved by amassing inventory, but that’s reached its stopping point, which is starting to cause international trade to falter.
If Pr(crash|drop) is not quite large, then Pr(smallish decline|any decline) should be reasonably big. Each observation of a drop without a crash is (some) evidence against the antecedent.
It sounds as if you think I was assuming that it is or should be, and I’m not sure why. Could you explain?
Each time you strike a match without blowing up might be evidence that you’re not in a building full of gasoline, but if you see the gasoline, the match-striking evidence doesn’t weigh nearly as heavily.
I was slightly more specific in another question chain about what I meant by slump, and a 10% drop isn’t quite what I had in mind (neither is today’s slump, which could rally again), which was more along the lines of a recession.
To clarify my prediction: I expect at least a recession. Given a recession, I expect a depression. If we don’t get a recession (which would surprise me somewhat), the absence of a depression won’t surprise me, but if we do get a recession, the absence of a depression will surprise me a lot.
Since approximately when?