Instrumentlal rationality and epistemic rationality aren’t the same. Epistemic rationality seeks to maxmise knowledge, truth and consistency. Instrumental rationality seeks to maximise efficiemcy, gain and personal utility.One area they come apart is signalling, the implicit and explicit ways we tell others what kind of person we are. The instrumentally rational way is to signal is to maximise your utility by sending out agreeable signals to whichever individual or group youhappen to need something from. This Vicar-of-Bray style behaviour will lead to your making highly inconsistent statements in the limit. If you want to signal sincerity, you will need to believe them too.So you will end up with inconsistent beliefs. So,IR+signalling is inconsistent with ER.
If you are scrutinised, in different siutations, by someone who cares about consistency, the benefit of inconsistent signalling vanishes.And noone is scrutinsed more than a politician in a healthy democracy. People read reports of politicians contradicting themselves and being inconsistent, and infer that politicians are unusually hypocritical.
But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence The ordinary persons hypocrisy is not publicised becausd the ordinary person does not have reporters following them round. The ordinary person typically moves in a number of fairly disjoimt circles—the workplace, family, same-sex friends and so on—signaling different loyalties to each. The existence of Chinese walls is even humorously acknowledged: “what happens in X stays in X”.
Inconsisten.cy reaches a peak when communicating with completely unconnected individuals and groups. My go-to example is a telesales operative Iwho would ring various people during the crude of a day and agree with every word they said. Her customers were of course unknown to each other and in no position to compare notes,.
Well, in the example you cited, the Vicar of Bray, one is dealing with the kind of religious fanatics who are likely to have low tolerance for hypocrisy and may very well do some investigation into one’s history.
This Vicar-of-Bray style behaviour will lead to your making highly inconsistent statements in the limit.
Will it?
Consider the regime of the official idea. Under certain regime structures, its direction of development is as obvious as its current state, and its current state is obvious. That is, there’s one group that you consistently need something from, and the only inconsistencies arise from its idea-drift over time—which can be predicted with a good deal of accuracy.
It’s a type, a pattern. I don’t mean to single out any particular regime. I suspect there are instances of this type, but I’ll leave that as an exercise for the reader.
Belief is for many things, including signaling.
Instrumentlal rationality and epistemic rationality aren’t the same. Epistemic rationality seeks to maxmise knowledge, truth and consistency. Instrumental rationality seeks to maximise efficiemcy, gain and personal utility.One area they come apart is signalling, the implicit and explicit ways we tell others what kind of person we are. The instrumentally rational way is to signal is to maximise your utility by sending out agreeable signals to whichever individual or group youhappen to need something from. This Vicar-of-Bray style behaviour will lead to your making highly inconsistent statements in the limit. If you want to signal sincerity, you will need to believe them too.So you will end up with inconsistent beliefs. So,IR+signalling is inconsistent with ER.
Of course the more times you switch sides, the harder it becomes for anyone to take your sincerity seriously.
Assuming you’re found out.
If you are scrutinised, in different siutations, by someone who cares about consistency, the benefit of inconsistent signalling vanishes.And noone is scrutinsed more than a politician in a healthy democracy. People read reports of politicians contradicting themselves and being inconsistent, and infer that politicians are unusually hypocritical.
But absence of evidence is not evidence of absence The ordinary persons hypocrisy is not publicised becausd the ordinary person does not have reporters following them round. The ordinary person typically moves in a number of fairly disjoimt circles—the workplace, family, same-sex friends and so on—signaling different loyalties to each. The existence of Chinese walls is even humorously acknowledged: “what happens in X stays in X”.
Inconsisten.cy reaches a peak when communicating with completely unconnected individuals and groups. My go-to example is a telesales operative Iwho would ring various people during the crude of a day and agree with every word they said. Her customers were of course unknown to each other and in no position to compare notes,.
Well, in the example you cited, the Vicar of Bray, one is dealing with the kind of religious fanatics who are likely to have low tolerance for hypocrisy and may very well do some investigation into one’s history.
Will it?
Consider the regime of the official idea. Under certain regime structures, its direction of development is as obvious as its current state, and its current state is obvious. That is, there’s one group that you consistently need something from, and the only inconsistencies arise from its idea-drift over time—which can be predicted with a good deal of accuracy.
Where is this regime ….?
It’s a type, a pattern. I don’t mean to single out any particular regime. I suspect there are instances of this type, but I’ll leave that as an exercise for the reader.
I suspect that there aren’t instances, hence my question.